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MANDATORY THIRD PARTY COMPLIANCE
EXAMINATIONS FOR INVESTMENT
ADVISERS: AN SEC WATERLOO?
Mercer Bullard*
ABSTRACT
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC or Commission) appears
to be on the verge of requiring investment advisers to undergo third party
examinations. One justification for the rulemaking is that the Commission
lacks sufficient resources to examine advisers frequently enough. Another is
to create indirectly a self-regulatory organization (SRO) for investments
advisers. Both may leave a rulemaking particularly vulnerable to challenge
as arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedures Act. This
Article considers three novel grounds on which a rulemaking may be
successfully challenged. Congress has repeatedly rejected SEC requests to
provide additional funding for examinations or to create an adviser SRO.
This Article speculates that the rulemaking could be successfully challenged
on the grounds that it usurps Congress’s power of the purse by imposing an
unauthorized tax on investment advisers, and/or Congress’s authority to
authorize the creation of an adviser SRO. On firmer ground, the Article
discusses the risk that Section 206(4) of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940,
under which a third party examination rule would likely be adopted, does not
authorize such broad rulemaking. Such a challenge could not only defeat the
rulemaking, but also undermine the viability of other rules adopted under
Section 206(4). This Article also considers some of the numerous examples
of third party examiners that could provide useful models for a third party
examination rule for advisers. It surveys seven types of third party examiners
in order to provide a framework for thinking about how a third party
compliance rule might be designed: nationally recognized statistical rating
organizations, proxy firm advisors, the CFA Institute, public company
auditors, compliance consultants, chief compliance officers, and surprise
and internal controls auditors. Each examiner serves a distinctly different
third party examination role and their regulation is equally varied, if not
always consistent.
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, a chorus of commentators has contended that investment
advisers regulated by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC or
* Butler Snow Lecturer and Professor of Law, and Director, Business Law Institute,
University of Mississippi School of Law. The author thanks Butler Snow LLC for its research
support, and the participants in the Brooklyn Journal of Corporate, Financial and Commercial Law
Annual Symposium, and the University of Mississippi School of Law Faculty Workshop Series for
their helpful comments and suggestions.
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Commission) are not examined frequently enough. In response to this
critique, the Commission appears to be on the verge of proposing to require
investment advisers to engage third parties to examine advisers’ compliance
policies and procedures. However, an increase in the frequency of adviser
examinations may not alone provide an adequate basis for rulemaking in an
environment in which courts are demanding that regulators base their
rulemakings on rigorous cost-benefit analyses.
The debate surrounding the third party examination concept has focused
almost exclusively on its potential to increase the frequency of adviser
examinations. There has been virtually no discussion of exactly what benefits
more frequent exams would create, much less what benefits examinations by
third parties would create, or what the costs of such examinations would be
and whether they would outweigh the benefits. If the Commission fails to
develop a reasoned basis for requiring third party adviser examinations, its
rulemaking runs a significant risk of being vacated pursuant to a legal
challenge.
A third party examination rule may also be challenged on somewhat
more speculative grounds. The SEC’s goal of increasing the frequency of
adviser examinations arguably casts the rule as an attempt to subvert
Congress’s authority in two respects. First, imposing a kind of tax on
investment advisers to pay for third party examinations could be viewed as
usurping Congress’s power of the purse, especially in light of Congress’s
repeated rebuffing of requests for additional SEC funding for examinations
and its rejection of a bill that would impose a tax on investment advisers for
the same purpose. Second, a third party examination rule could be viewed as
usurping Congress’s legislative prerogative to create an investment adviser
self-regulatory organization (SRO). Congress has repeatedly rejected
proposals to create a SRO for investment advisers, including, specifically, an
SRO authorized only to conduct examinations of investment advisers.
On firmer ground, a third party examination rule may be challenged on
the theory that the Commission lacks the authority under the Investment
Advisers Act of 1940 (Advisers Act) to adopt the rule. The rule would likely
be adopted under Section 206(4) of the Advisers Act, which requires the
Commission to adopt rules that “define, and prescribe means reasonably
designed to prevent, such acts, practices, and courses of business as are
fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative.”1 A failure to retain a third party
compliance examiner is not fraud, and it is questionable whether requiring
third party examinations is “reasonably necessary” to prevent fraud. The
Commission has adopted a number of rules under Section 206(4) that raise
the same issue. An adverse ruling on the SEC’s authority to adopt a third
1. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank), Pub. L. No.
111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6(4) (2012)).
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party examination rule could affect the continued viability of these rules as
well, and thereby significantly weaken the SEC’s ability to regulate
investment advisers.
Fortunately for the Commission, the numerous examples of preexisting
third party compliance examiners and similar constructs provide strong
precedent for a third party examination rule for investment advisers. The role
and regulation of these examiners may also provide a helpful guide for the
SEC’s cost-benefit analysis of a third party examination rule for investment
advisers. Some of these involve third party examinations that the
Commission has directly or indirectly required for investment advisers, such
as: (1) surprise and internal controls audits, which are required for advisers
that have custody of client assets, (2) chief compliance officers (CCOs), who
must be designated by advisers, (3) compliance consultants, who must be
retained by an adviser as a condition of settling an enforcement action, and
(4) advisers’ investment performance calculations under the Global
Investment Performance Standards (GIPS) promulgated by the CFA
Institute.
These third party examiner models are particularly relevant because they
entail the direct or indirect examination of investment adviser legal
compliance. A third party examiner rule for investment advisers is likely to
incorporate specific elements of each or even replace them wholesale. These
third party examiner models have the disadvantage, however, of having been
the subject of limited debate and having led virtually static lives. As a result,
they have left a relatively thin record by which to evaluate their efficacy.
In contrast, there are prominent third party examiner models that have
undergone vigorous debate and substantial reforms, which have created a
voluminous record of public vetting. Credit rating agencies that the
Commission has designated “nationally recognized statistical rating
organizations” (NRSROs) and accounting firms that audit public companies
bore the lion’s share of blame for the Enron-Worldcom scandals of 2002 and
the Financial Crisis of 2008.2 As a result, from 2002 to 2010, the regulation

2. At least one member of Congress has already referenced the NRSRO experience in
questioning the propriety of requiring third party examination for investment advisers. See
Oversight of the SEC’s Division of Investment Management: Hearing before the Subcomm. on
Capital Mkts. & Gov’t Sponsored Enters., H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 114th Cong. (Oct. 23, 2015)
[hereinafter Oversight Hearing] (quoting Representative Brad Sherman, “I’m a bit concerned about
the idea of using third parties because I’ve seen what happened in the bond rating area where they
basically created the greatest catastrophe of our lifetimes because the bond rating agency is selected
by the issuer. If we’re going to have these outside firms come in are they going to be selected by
the fund or would the SEC have a panel and assign the way, say, bankruptcy trustees are assigned
from a panel. And wouldn’t my grades have been much better if I could have determined which
professor graded my paper and paid him . . . . The idea that you’re going to have an outside grader
who’s paid and selected by the people that are grading didn’t work out so well in 2008 and you
ought to take a look at a system where those doing the grading can’t become more profitable by
putting out the word they are easy graders.”).
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of NRSROs and public-company auditors was transformed.3Unlike public
company auditors, NRSROs have a direct connection to investment advisers.
They have a close relationship with advisers because advisers are primary
users of NRSRO debt ratings, and the ratings provide an indirect means by
which advisers comply with certain regulations.
Another prominent third party examiner model, the proxy advisory firm,
has recently been subject to a high level of scrutiny and may be on the brink
of a major regulatory overhaul.4 Like NRSROs, proxy advisory firms do not
examine investment advisers as such, but they have a close relationship with
advisers because the proxy advisory firm’s voting recommendations provide
a means by which investment advisers achieve legal compliance. There has
been very little analysis of third party examinations for investment advisers.5
This Article sets the stage for consideration of a third party examiner rule
for investment advisers. Part I describes how the SEC’s interest in such a
rulemaking has evolved and the risk of a successful legal challenge to the
rulemaking on cost-benefit grounds. Part II discusses novel grounds for
challenging the rulemaking, including claims that the rulemaking would
usurp Congress’s power of the purse or its power to create an investment
adviser SRO, or would otherwise exceed the SEC’s rulemaking power under
the Advisers Act’s antifraud provisions. Part III discusses the function and
characteristics of numerous third party examiner models and surveys the
regulation of these models.
I. BACKGROUND
A. EVOLUTION OF THE SEC’S CURRENT INTEREST IN A THIRD
PARTY EXAMINATION RULE
In the space of less than two years, the prospect that the Commission will
require registered investment advisers to engage third party compliance
examiners has evolved from a shot across the bow to a missile approaching
its target. Interest in the issue had lain dormant since 2003, when the
Commission floated mandatory third party examinations as one of four
options for improving investment adviser compliance.6 The SEC’s interest
was reignited in 2014, when former SEC Commissioner Daniel Gallagher
suggested that mandatory third party examinations for advisers would
3. See infra Parts IV(A) and (D).
4. See infra Part IV(C).
5. See JAMES ANGEL, CENTER FOR FINANCIAL MARKETS AND POLICY ON THE REGULATION

INVESTMENT ADVISORY SERVICES: WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE? (2011),
http://www.thefiduciaryinstitute.org/wpcontent/uploads/2013/02/AngelWhereDoWeGofromHere.pdf. The possibility of requiring third
party examinations was the topic of a 2010 roundtable discussion hosted by this author. A
memorandum on the roundtable is on file with this author and available upon request.
6. See Compliance Programs of Investment Companies and Investment Advisers, Advisers Act
Release No. 2107, 79 SEC Docket 1696 (Feb. 5, 2003) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 270, 275).
OF
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address the perceived inadequacy of the SEC’s adviser examination
program.7
Commissioner Gallagher’s original proposal to require third party
examinations of advisers referred to his perception that the greater frequency
of broker-dealer examinations created a statistical imbalance between the
amount of reported misconduct by broker-dealers and investment advisers.8
He complained of a “common misconception” that misconduct was
“exclusively or even primarily a broker-dealer problem rather than an
investment adviser problem as well.”9 Commissioner Gallagher subsequently
added, in connection with comments regarding the level of SEC adviser
examinations, that he was “worried that the SEC might miss the next huge
investor rip-off along the lines of the multibillion-dollar Ponzi scheme
perpetrated by Bernard Madoff.”10
Commissioner Gallagher’s comments received a fair of amount of
attention in the financial press, eventually leading SEC Chair Mary Jo White
to express interest in the concept,11 then to ask her staff to evaluate it,12 and
later to state that she believed that the Commission “will need to ‘move to a
program of third-party compliance exams.’”13 One reporter appeared to

7. Daniel M. Gallagher, Comm’r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Remarks at the 46th Annual
Rocky Mountain Securities Conference, Denver, Colorado (May 9, 2014) [hereinafter 2014
Gallagher Remarks], https://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/1370541779229. See also
Wall Street Reform: Assessing and Enhancing the Financial Regulatory System: Hearing before the
S. Comm. on Banking, Hous. & Urban Affairs (Sep. 9, 2014) (testimony of Mary Jo White, Chair,
U.S Sec. & Exch. Comm’n). The Commission examined 9% of advisers in fiscal year (FY) 2013.
8. See 2014 Gallagher Remarks, supra note 7. Cf. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, FY 2016
BUDGET REQUEST BY PROGRAM 67 (2015) [hereinafter FY 2016 BUDGET REQUEST BY PROGRAM],
https://www.sec.gov/about/reports/sec-fy2016-budget-request-by-program.pdf (stating that the
Commission “examined approximately ten percent of registered [investment] advisers in FY 2014
. . . . regulators are examining well below one percent of the approximately 160,000 branch offices
each year”).
9. 2014 Gallagher Remarks, supra note 7.
10. Mark Schoeff, Jr., RIAs Should Be Forced to Hire Outside Examiners: Gallagher,
INVESTMENT NEWS (May 20, 2014, 2:35 PM), http://www.investmentnews.com/article/20140520/
FREE/140529989. It is not clear how the Madoff scandal supports increasing adviser examinations
relative to broker-dealer examinations. All the misconduct in which Madoff engaged occurred
during the time he was associated with a broker-dealer and very little occurred when his firm was a
registered investment adviser. See Mercer Bullard, Madoff Scandal: Who Was Really Asleep at the
Switch?, MORNINGSTAR (June 18, 2009, 6:00 AM), http://news.morningstar.com/articlenet/article.
aspx?id=295708.
11. Mark Schoeff, Jr., SEC’s White Calls Third-Party Adviser Exam Idea ‘Creative’,
INVESTMENT NEWS (May 22, 2014, 12:01 PM) http://www.investmentnews.com/article/20140522
/FREE/140529966 (quoting Chair White, referring to Commissioner Gallagher’s third party
examiner proposal: “[h]is suggestion is a creative one”).
12. See Mark Schoeff, Jr., SEC’s White Defends Coverage of Investment Advisers, INVESTMENT
NEWS (Dec. 17, 2014, 4:40 PM), http://www.investmentnews.com/article/20141217/FREE/141219
920/secs-white-defends-coverage-of-investment-advisers (quoting Chair White, “I have asked the
staff to do a current evaluation of the third-party compliance review concept.”).
13. Michael J. Missal et. al., Heard at the SIFMA Conference, K&L GATES: LEGAL INSIGHT 2,
(Apr. 6, 2015), http://www.klgateshub.com/files/Publication/3fc49320-6b73-4af1-968e-dbaf3eb
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paraphrase Chair White as stating that “[t]he move would be designed to help
the agency’s Office of Compliance Inspections and Examinations increase its
oversight of advisers.”14 Other than the general goal of “improv[ing] overall
compliance by registered investment advisers,” Chair White has not
specifically cited any potential benefit other than increasing the frequency of
adviser examinations.
In October 2015, SEC Division of Investment Management (IM)
Director David Grim confirmed in testimony before Congress that the staff
was “developing a recommendation for the Commission’s consideration that,
if proposed and adopted, would establish a program of third-party
compliance reviews for registered investment advisers.”15The only reference
in his testimony to the purpose of a third party examination rule was his view
that it would “improve compliance by registered investment advisers.”16 He
did not elaborate further in comments at the related hearing. Chair White
stated in February 2016 that she would seek to introduce a program for third
party compliance reviews,17 and as of this writing she is reportedly reviewing
a draft proposal.18
Chair White has had more to say about the potential costs of third party
examinations than the potential benefits. In a letter to Congress, she noted
three concerns that had been identified in the SEC’s 2003 Concept Release:
894ba/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/271af39c-b38e-4f4f-8ecf-a6f83fdb5da1/GE_Alert_04
062015.pdf [hereinafter SIFMA Conference].
14. Mark Schoeff, Jr., SEC Fiduciary Push Gives Momentum to Third-Party Exams,
INVESTMENT NEWS (Mar. 18, 2015, 1:55 PM), http://www.investmentnews.com/article/20150318/
FREE/150319897/sec-fiduciary-push-gives-momentum-to-third-party-exams.
See
SIFMA
Conference, supra note 13, at 2 (summarizing Chair White’s comments that she intends to require
third party examinations “in order to get out and examine more registered investment advisers”).
See Letter from Mary Jo White, Chair, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, to Jeb Hensarling, Chairman,
H. Comm. on Fin. Servs. (Dec. 16, 2014) [hereinafter White Letter], https://www.investmentadviser
.org/eWeb/docs/Public/141216seclttr.pdf. Third party examinations could “increase the frequency
with which our staff could examine funds and advisers.” Id. at 2.
15. Oversight Hearing, supra note 2 (testimony of David W. Grim, Dir., Div. of Inv. Mgmt.,
Sec. & Exch. Comm’n). See also SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, AGENCY FINANCIAL REPORT, FISCAL
YEAR 2015 34 (2015) (listed among “Major Regulatory Initiatives”: “Develop . . . a program of
third-party compliance reviews for registered investment advisors.”).
16. Oversight Hearing, supra note 2 (testimony of David W. Grim).
17. Mark Schoeff, Jr., White Vows to Forge Ahead on Fiduciary Duty, Third-Party Exams
Despite Diminished SEC, INVESTMENT NEWS (Feb. 19, 2016, 11:45 AM), http://www.investment
news.com/article/20160219/FREE/160219915/white-vows-to-forge-ahead-on-fiduciary-dutythird-party-exams?NLID=daily&NL_issueDate=20160219&utm_source=Daily-20160219&utm_
medium=email&utm_campaign=investmentnews&utm_visit=178886. See also Schoeff, Jr, supra
note 10 (paraphrasing Commissioner Gallagher as “want[ing] registered investment advisers to be
forced to hire third-party contractors to conduct examinations”); Schoeff, Jr., supra note 14 (stating
that Chair “White said Tuesday the SEC also should implement a program of third-party compliance
exams of advisers”).
18. Mark Schoeff, Jr., SEC Gets Staff Recommendation to Allow Third-Party Exams,
INVESTMENT NEWS (Sep. 27, 2016, 12:18 PM), http://www.investmentnews.com/article/20160927/
FREE/160929926/sec-gets-staff-recommendation-to-allow-third-party-exams (quoting White,
“The staff has completed their recommendation [to allow third-party exams]: a proposal which is
now with my fellow commissioners”),
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1. The costs of a third party review (particularly as it relates to small
advisers);
2. Standards for or expertise of the reviewers; and
3. Potential conflicts of interest which may impact the quality of
reviews given that third parties may be incentivized to maintain
their professional relationships.19
The SEC’s sensitivity to the potential costs of third party examinations will
be important in weathering objections, including legal challenges, to a third
party examination rulemaking.
As of this writing, it appears that the Commission is leaning toward
releasing a proposal for third party examinations, rather than a release
requesting comments on the concept.20 Issuing a proposal, rather than a
concept release, suggests that the Commission has developed an adequate
cost-benefit structure within which to propose a rule that meets cost-benefit
standards. This is certainly possible based on the SEC staff’s internal analysis
and its experience with similar past proposals. As discussed immediately
below, a strong cost-benefit analysis may be critical to the rule’s survival.

B. SEC RULEMAKING COST-BENEFIT REQUIREMENTS AND LEGAL
CHALLENGES
Scrutiny of SEC cost-benefit analysis has become a focal point for
Congress and the courts.21 Although SEC rulemaking is not subject to an
explicit cost-benefit analysis requirement as such, it is subject to the
Administrative Procedure Act’s (APA) arbitrary and capricious standard,
which may amount to the same thing.22 The Advisers Act requires the
Commission to “consider, in addition to the protection of investors, whether
the action will promote efficiency, competition, and capital formation” when
adopting rules, which require a finding that the rule is “necessary or
19. See White Letter, supra note 14, at 2.
20. See id.
21. See generally John C. Coates, IV, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Financial Regulation: Case

Studies and Implications, 124 YALE L.J. 882, 882 (2015).
22. See, e.g., Chamber of Commerce v. SEC, 412 F.3d 133, 143–44 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (basing
arbitrary and capricious finding on failure to satisfy Investment Company Act requirement to
“consider . . . whether the [rule] will promote efficiency, competition, and capital formation”). See
generally Nadelle Grossman, The Sixth Commissioner, 49 GEO. L. REV. 693, 700–02 (2015); Robert
L. Jackson, Cost-Benefit Analysis and the Courts, 78 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 55, 62 (2015); Donna
M. Nagy, The Costs of Mandatory Cost-Benefit Analysis in Sec Rulemaking, 57 ARIZ. L. REV. 129,
141–42 (2015). SEC rulemaking is also required to minimize its rules’ paperwork burdens and
burdens on small businesses, and to submit rules to the U.S. Comptroller General, which is required
to provide an assessment to Congress on any “major” rule, i.e., a rule that is expected to have an
economic impact of $100 million or more. See Regulatory Planning and Review, Executive Order
No. 12866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Sept. 30, 1993). The rule’s effect is suspended from the date the
Comptroller’s assessment is submitted, during which time Congress has the power to veto the rule
by joint resolution, subject only to a veto by the President. See 5 U.S.C. § 802 (2012).
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appropriate in the public interest.”23 The Commission has taken the position
that it will comply with the cost-benefit analysis guidance in Executive
Orders 12866 and 13563.24 The Commission is also likely to be somewhat
inhibited by the shadow of numerous bills that have been floated in Congress
that would impose additional cost-benefit restrictions on SEC rulemaking.
Putting a fine edge on its cost-benefit analysis obligations, the
Commission has recently seen a number of its rules vacated by the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.25 For example, the D.C.
Circuit has vacated, on cost-benefit grounds, separate SEC proposals to
require mutual fund boards to appoint an independent chair and a 75 percent
independent board (twice), treat fixed-index annuities as securities, require
public companies to provide information on shareholder-nominated board
candidates, and require certain designations regarding public companies’ use
of conflict minerals.26 The D.C. Circuit also vacated the SEC’s proposal to
exempt certain brokers from being regulated as investments advisers and its
attempt to require advisers to private funds to register as investment advisers,
in each case on the ground that the rule exceeded the SEC’s authority.27 The
challenge to the broker-dealer exemption was brought by the Financial
Planning Association, which would have a strong interest against a third party
examination rule and may be first in line to challenge it.
23. Dodd-Frank, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 80b2(c) (2012)). Notably, this requirement does not apply to rulemaking under the Advisers Act’s
antifraud provision, which does not require such a “necessary and appropriate” finding. See id. §
80b-6(4).
24. See Memorandum from the U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Div. of Risk, Strategy, and Fin.
Innovation and Office of Gen. Counsel on the Current Guidance on Economic Analysis in SEC
Rulemakings to Staff of the Rulewriting Divisions and Offices 3–4 (Mar. 16, 2012),
https://www.sec.gov/divisions/riskfin/rsfi_guidance_econ_analy_secrulemaking.pdf. See generally
U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., FOLLOW-UP REVIEW OF COST-BENEFIT
ANALYSES IN SELECTED SEC DODD-FRANK ACT RULEMAKINGS (Jan. 27, 2012),
https://www.sec.gov/about/offices/oig/reports/audits/2012/rpt499_followupreviewofdf_costbenefitanalyses_508.pdf; U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., REPORT
OF REVIEW OF ECONOMIC ANALYSES CONDUCTED BY THE SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N IN
CONNECTION WITH DODD-FRANK ACT RULEMAKINGS (2011), https://www.sec.gov/about/offices/
oig/reports/audits/2011/report_6_13_11.pdf. The SEC’s Aversion to Cost-Benefit Analysis, Hearing
before the H. Subcomm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform (2011) (testimony of Mercer Bullard).
25. See James D. Cox & Benjamin J.C. Baucom, The Emperor Has No Clothes: Confronting
the D.C. Circuit’s Usurpation of SEC Rulemaking Authority, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1811, 1814 (2012)
(“Until very recent years, SEC-adopted rules enjoyed a blissful existence before the D.C. Circuit.
The turning point came in 2005 when, in Chamber of Commerce v. SEC, the Chamber challenged
rules the SEC adopted under the Investment Company Act.”).
26. Nat’l Ass’n Mfr. v. SEC, 748 F.3d 359 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (conflict minerals); Bus. Roundtable
v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (board candidates); Am. Equity Inv. Life Ins. Co. v. SEC,
613 F.3d 166 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (fixed indexed annuities); Chamber of Commerce v. SEC, 412 F.3d
133 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (fund boards); Chamber of Commerce v. SEC, 443 F.3d 890 (D.C. Cir. 2006)
(fund boards).
27. See Fin. Planning Ass’n v. SEC, 482 F.3d 481 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (broker-dealer exemption);
Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (hedge fund registration). The same court also
rejected the SEC’s position that viatical settlements are securities. See SEC v. Life Partners, Inc.,
87 F.3d 536 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
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The twice vacated independent mutual fund chairman rule may have
special relevance to a third party examination rulemaking. The role of an
independent mutual fund chair is somewhat analogous to that of a third party
examiner. Mutual fund directors’ primary responsibilities entail compliance
oversight, particularly with respect to the conflict of interest between a fund
and its investment adviser.28 An independent mutual fund chair offers, at least
for fund advisers, a potential alternative to requiring a third party examiner.
Fund boards have the authority to require third party examinations and
frequently do, which will beg the question of why an independent chair is not
already in the best position to evaluate whether expanded use of third party
examinations is appropriate. The vast majority of funds already have a
majority of independent directors, and more than half already have an
independent chair.29 The failure to adequately consider alternatives was one
basis for the D.C. Circuit’s rejection of the mutual fund independent
chairman rule. Additionally, the industry may contend that third party
examinations would be more burdensome than the independent chair
requirement that a court has twice vacated.
The cases in which Advisers Act rules were challenged may create more
significant problems for the Commission.30 In both cases, the court found that
the Commission had exceeded its authority under the Advisers Act. As
discussed in Part C of the immediately following section, there are
compelling arguments that a third party examination rule also would exceed
the SEC’s authority.
If the Commission intends to justify a third party examination
requirement on the ground that it lacks the resources to conduct adequate
inspections of investment advisers, then it may have to make a stronger case
than it has made in the past. In a 2014 report, for example, the SEC staff
appeared to attribute declines in the number of examinations primarily to
declines in staff levels,31 but the data tell a different story. The most
significant decline discussed in the report occurred from 2008 to 2010, when
adviser examinations declined from 1,521 in 2008, to 1,244 in 2009 and to
1,083 in 2010. However, the number of examiners dedicated to adviser
28. See SEC Adopts Rules Designed to Enhance Effectiveness of Mutual Fund Directors, SEC
NEWS DIGEST 2001-2 (Jan. 3, 2001), https://www.sec.gov/news/press/2001-1.txt (“Mutual fund
independent directors are an investor’s front-line defense against conflicts of interest and other
potential abuses.”); Am. Bar. Ass’n et. al., Fund Director’s Guidebook, 52 BUS. LAW. 229, 259
(1996) (describing directors’ compliance responsibilities).
29. See MUT. FUND DIRS. FORUM, COST IMPLICATIONS OF AN INDEPENDENT CHAIR AND A 75
PERCENT INDEPENDENT BOARD 2–3 (Aug. 30, 2005), http://mfdf.org/images/DirResPDFs/Report
ofSurvey_1.pdf (thirty-six of forty-five fund complexes surveyed had an independent chair and
forty-one of forty-five had a board that was at least 75% independent).
30. See generally Financial Planning Ass’n, 482 F.3d at 481–501; Goldstein, 451 F.3d at 873–
84.
31. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, DIV. OF INV. MGMT., STUDY ON ENHANCING INVESTMENT
ADVISER EXAMINATIONS 38 (2011) [hereinafter SECTION 914 SEC STUDY], https://www.sec.gov
/news/studies/2011/914studyfinal.pdf.
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examinations increased during this period, from 425 to 447 to 460.32
Inspections rose from 1,346 to 1,379 from 2006 to 2007, but the number of
adviser examiners declined from 475 to 425. The staff indicated that the
decline was partly attributable to its devoting more resources to (1) for-cause
examinations and examinations of higher-risk advisers (which take longer)
and (2) “additional resource intensive procedures such as enhanced asset
verification to detect fraud and misappropriation of investor assets.”33 This
second factor suggests that the number of examinations is more closely
linked to the allocation of resources, rather than the number of examiners.34
II. NOVEL CHALLENGES TO A THIRD PARTY EXAMINATIONS
RULE
In addition to the kind of cost-benefit challenge discussed supra, another
novel challenge to a third party examination rule for investment advisers may
be based on the argument that the Commission lacks the authority to adopt
the rule under the Advisers Act’s antifraud provision. Specifically, Section
206(4) of the Act provides that the Commission shall adopt rules that “define,
and prescribe means reasonably designed to prevent, such acts, practices, and
courses of business as are fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative.”35 The
Commission has interpreted broadly the range of requirements that are
“reasonably designed to prevent” fraud.36 A mandatory third party
examination requirement may nevertheless exceed the limits of this authority.
Another novel, but far more speculative ground for challenging a third
party examination rule is that it usurps Congressional authority. As discussed
supra, a primary justification for the rule is that the Commission lacks the
resources to conduct a satisfactory level of examinations, and mandatory
third party examinations—paid for by investment advisers—would solve this
problem. However, Congress has specifically considered and declined to act
on proposals to increase the SEC’s funding to provide for more frequent
examinations. Some have expressed the view that mandatory third party
32. Id. at 11, 14. See also Letter from Jeb Hensarling, Chairman, Comm. on Fin. Serv., U.S.
House of Representatives, & Scott Garrett, Chairman, Subcomm. on Capital Mkts. & Gov’t
Sponsored Enters., Comm. on Fin. Servs., U.S. House of Representatives, to Chair, U.S. Sec. &
Exch. Comm’n, Mary Jo White n.1 [hereinafter Hensarling-Garrett Letter] (Nov. 24, 2014) (citing
same data), https://www.investmentadviser.org/eWeb/docs/Public/141124_lttr.pdf.
33. Id. at 14–15.
34. This view is reinforced by the SEC’s recent shift of broker-dealer examiners to investment
adviser examinations, which subsequently triggered the assignment of about forty-five SEC staff to
oversee FINRA “because [the Commission] will be somewhat more dependent on them for brokerdealer exams in the first instance.” Elizabeth Dilts, SEC Says to Monitor Partner Regulator’s
Brokerage Oversight, REUTERS (Oct. 17, 2016, 9:15 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-secregulations-finra-idUSKBN12H2AG (discussing SEC’s shifting of examination staff and creating
a FINRA and Securities Industry Oversight group).
35. Dodd-Frank, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 80b6(4) (2012)).
36. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-1(a)(1) (2016) (prohibiting the use of testimonials).
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examinations would also provide a means of establishing a SRO for
investment advisers, but Congress has also specifically considered and
declined to act on proposals to create an investment adviser SRO. The SEC’s
plans beg the question of whether a third party examination requirement
would constitute a usurpation of Congressional authority.
A. THIRD PARTY EXAMINATIONS AND THE SEC’S ANTIFRAUD
RULEMAKING AUTHORITY
The Commission would likely adopt a third party examination rule for
investment advisers under Section 206(4) of the Advisers Act. Section 206
of the Act makes it unlawful for an investment adviser:
1. To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud any client
or prospective client;37 or
2. To engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business
which operates as a fraud or deceit upon any client or prospective
client.38
Section 206(4) makes it unlawful for an investment adviser “to engage in any
act, practice, or course of business which is fraudulent, deceptive, or
manipulative,” and requires the Commission adopt rules that “define, and
prescribe means reasonably designed to prevent” fraudulent, deceptive, or
manipulative acts, practices or courses of business.39 Relying on this
authority, the Commission has adopted rules requiring surprise and internal
controls audits, chief compliance officers and CCO reports, and written
compliance procedures of general scope and specifically related to proxy
37. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6(1) (2012).
38. Id. § 80b-6(2). Section 206(3) prohibits principal trading between advisers and their clients.

See id. § 80b–6(3). Advisers Act Section 206 is similar to Securities Act Section 17 and Exchange
Act Rule 10b-5. Section 206 makes it unlawful, inter alia
(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud any client or prospective client;
(2) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which operates as a fraud
or deceit upon any client or prospective client; . . . or (4) to engage in any act, practice,
or course of business which is fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative.

Id. §§ 80b–6(1), (2), (4). Section 17 makes it unlawful, inter alia, “(1) to employ any device, scheme,
or artifice to defraud, . . . or (3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser.” Id. §§ 77q(a)(1), (3). Rule 10b5 makes it unlawful, inter alia, “(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, . . . or (c)
To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or
deceit upon any person.” 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.10b-5(a), (c). The Supreme Court has held that
investment advisers have a fiduciary duty to their clients under Section 206. See SEC v. Capital
Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 181–82 (1963).
39. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6(4). Unlike Section 206, Exchange Act Section 10(b), under which Rule
10b-5 was adopted, is not self-executing. Section 10(b) makes it unlawful to “to use or employ, in
connection with the purchase or sale of [a security,] any manipulative or deceptive device or
contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as
necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.” Id. § 78j(b). Section
17 of the Securities Act does not specifically authorize SEC rulemaking. See id. § 77q.
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voting. The Commission would most likely adopt a third party examination
rule under that same authority.40
The scope of the SEC’s authority under Section 206(4) has not received
much scrutiny. This provision could be read to authorize two types of rules:
(1) rules that “define” fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative acts
(hereinafter, “fraud”), and (2) rules that “are reasonably designed to prevent”
fraud. The first category would not apply, because failing to retain a third
party to conduct a compliance examination would not be fraudulent. A third
party examination rule presumably would fall under the “reasonably
designed to prevent” fraud category.
In some cases, antifraud rules under Section 206(4) appear to fit squarely
within the “reasonably designed to prevent” fraud category. For example,
Rule 206(4)-2 (the Custody Rule) requires that, when an adviser has custody
of client assets, the assets be kept “[i]n a separate account for each client
under that client’s name.”41 Commingling client assets might not be per se
fraud, but it is closely related to the risk of embezzlement. The relationship
reflects a strong nexus between the rule’s “design” and a type of fraud that it
would prevent. The Custody Rule’s anti-commingling provision, therefore,
would appear to meet the standard for the “reasonably designed to prevent”
fraud category under Section 206(4). This analysis treats the issue of whether
the provision is “reasonably” designed as a question of whether the nexus
between the “design” and fraud prevention was sufficiently strong.
In other cases, antifraud rules under Section 206(4) neither prohibit fraud
nor reflect a strong nexus between a type of fraud and the rule’s design. The
Custody Rule also requires that client assets be held by a Qualified Custodian
(e.g., a bank, broker-dealer, futures commission merchant, or foreign

40. It is possible, although unlikely, that the Commission could adopt the rule under authority
granted by Section 913(f) of the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010, which permits the Commission to
“commence a rulemaking . . . to address the legal or regulatory standards of care” for investment
advisers in providing personalized advice to retail investors. Dodd-Frank § 913(f).
41. Investment Advisers Act, 50 Fed. Reg. 42,909 (Oct. 23, 1985) (codified at 17 C.F.R. §
275.206(4)-2(a)(1)(i) (2016)). See also Treasury Regulation, 25 Fed. Reg. 14,021 (codified at 26
C.F.R. § 1.408-2 (2016)) (prohibiting commingling of Individual Retirement Account assets). The
Supreme Court has addressed and narrowed the scope of the SEC’s rulemaking authority under
Exchange Act Section 10(b), but that Section authorizes only rules identifying deceptive conduct.
See supra notes 37–38; Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 473 (1977) (“The language of
§ 10(b) gives no indication that Congress meant to prohibit any conduct not involving manipulation
or deception. Nor have we been cited to any evidence in the legislative history that would support a
departure from the language of the statute.”); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 213–14
(1976) (“The rulemaking power granted to an administrative agency charged with the administration
of a federal statute is not the power to make law. Rather, it is ‘the power to adopt regulations to
carry into effect the will of Congress as expressed by the statute.’ Thus, despite the broad view of
[Rule 10b-5] advanced by the Commission in this case, its scope cannot exceed the power granted
the Commission by Congress under § 10(b).” (internal citations omitted)). Unlike Section 206(4),
Section 10(b) does not also authorize rules “reasonably designed to prevent” deceptive conduct. See
supra note 38.
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financial institution).42 Using a non-Qualified Custodian could not be
described as inherently fraudulent, which leaves only the “reasonably
designed to prevent” authority. But the “Qualified Custodian” requirement is
not nearly as closely (or “reasonably”) connected to the risk of fraud as the
commingling prohibition.43 Banks’ custodial contracts may provide far less
protection to client assets than the protection that an investment adviser might
provide.44
This issue is presented more starkly by Advisers Act Rule 206(4)-1(a)(1),
which unconditionally prohibits advisers from using testimonials in
advertisements.45 There is nothing inherently fraudulent about using
testimonials, which, again, leaves only the “reasonably designed to prevent”
authority. However, the nexus between the testimonial prohibition and a
particular fraud is weak, at best. Commingling leans in one direction—
toward fraud. In contrast, a testimonial may provide useful information as
well as disseminate misrepresentations. If the term “reasonably” requires a
strong connection between a requirement that is “designed to prevent” fraud
and a specific fraud or type of fraud, then the testimonial prohibition sits near,
if not well beyond, the outer limits of this requirement.
The same issue arises in the context of broad based compliance
requirements. The requirements that advisers retain a CCO and adopt written
compliance policies and procedures are not designed to prevent a particular
fraud or type of fraud. They are broadly designed to prevent violations of
federal securities law. In the context of Section 206(4), “broadly” designed
rules and “reasonably” designed rules may be mutually exclusive. If Section
206(4) does not authorize the CCO and written procedures requirements, then
neither would it authorize a third party examination requirement.
The two-category reading of Section 206(4) set forth above is not beyond
doubt. The rule requires rules that “define, and prescribe means reasonably
designed to prevent,” fraud. Under accepted grammatical usage, the commas
following “define” and “prevent” would be read to describe only one
category of rule, that is, a rule that both defined and was reasonably designed
to prevent fraud. Under this reading, Section 206(4) does not, technically,
42. The rule’s Qualified Custodian requirement is akin to the statutory requirement that an IRA
custodian generally be a bank. See I.R.C. § 408(h) (2012). However, Congress authorized the IRS
to permit nonbanks to custody IRA assets, and the IRS has exercised this authority with respect to
dozens of non-bank entities that would not be Qualified Custodians under Rule 206(4)-2. See
Nonbank Trustees Approved as of February 1, 2016, (Feb. 2, 2016), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irstege/nonbank_trustee_list.pdf.
43. Cf. OFFICE OF COMPLIANCE INSPECTIONS & EXAMINATIONS, SIGNIFICANT DEFICIENCIES
INVOLVING ADVISER CUSTODY AND SAFETY OF CLIENT ASSETS (Mar. 4, 2013),
https://www.sec.gov/info/iaiccco/iaiccco-custody.pdf (listing adviser deficiencies relating to
custody that relate directly to the risk of fraud, e.g., client assets being held in the adviser’s name).
44. See, e.g., Szulik v. State St. Bank & Tr. Co., 935 F. Supp. 2d 240, 262 (D. Mass. 2013)
(rejecting a breach of contract claim on the ground that terms of custodial contract did not prohibit
custodian from “disbursing funds in connection with facially irregular transactions”).
45. 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-1(a)(1) (prohibiting the use of testimonials).
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authorize any rule that does not “define” the relevant fraudulent conduct.
Thus, the anti-commingling rule would be authorized only to the extent that
the rule both defined the fraud, e.g., embezzlement, and was reasonably
designed to prevent it.
In the case of the commingling prohibition, this may be a distinction
without a difference. The fraud that the anti-commingling provision is
designed to prevent is somewhat self-evident. Requiring the Commission to
“spell it out” would be unnecessarily hyper technical. Similarly, but with less
certainty, surprise and internal controls audits and proxy voting conflict-ofinterest procedures are designed to prevent frauds that are arguably selfevident.46
However, there is no specific fraud that mandatory CCOs, CCO reports,
or general compliance procedures are designed to prevent. These rules are
intended to prevent fraud, but not a defined fraud as Section 206(4) could be
read to require. The same would be true for a third party examination rule for
investment advisers, which is intended to promote general compliance.47 The
fraud that such a rule would be designed to prevent could not be defined in
any meaningful sense.
A middle ground would interpret the two-category approach in light of a
grammatical structure. Under this reading, a rule would be “reasonably
designed to prevent” fraud only if there exists a strong nexus between a
defined fraud and the rule’s requirements. This interpretation might provide
a fairly strong basis for requiring surprise and internal controls audits and
proxy voting conflict-of-interest procedures because of the greater leeway
allowed in showing the nexus between the rule and the particular fraud that
it is intended to prevent. But this interpretive approach would still leave broad
based compliance requirements in limbo.
A third party examination rule may provide fertile ground for testing the
scope of the SEC’s rulemaking authority under Section 206(4). Such a
challenge would threaten not only the implementation of that rule, but also
the continued viability of a number of other rules promulgated under Section
206(4). However, as discussed infra in Part IV, the SEC has a long and varied
history of requiring third party examinations or their equivalents, which
would bode poorly for a such a challenge and, as discussed immediately
below, the claim that a third party examination requirement for advisers
usurps Congressional authority.
46. However, this position requires an answer to a difficult existential question: at what point,
if any, would a series of separate compliance procedures rules, each targeted at a specific area of
compliance and, therefore, a particular fraud, as a group exceed the authority granted by Section
206(4)?
47. See Oversight of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Hearing before the S.
Comm. on Banking, Hous. & Urban Affairs (June 14, 2016) (testimony of Chair White) (stating that
third party adviser examinations “would be designed to improve overall compliance by registered
investment advisers”).
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B. THIRD PARTY EXAMINATIONS AS EXERCISE OF
APPROPRIATION/TAXATION AUTHORITY
One purpose of a third party examination requirement for advisers
appears to be to remedy the inadequacy of SEC funding to examine advisers
with sufficient frequency. The Commission has specifically asked Congress
for additional funding for adviser examinations,48 but Congress has not
granted its request. Some members of Congress have contended that the
Commission could increase the frequency of adviser examinations by
managing its examinations more efficiently.49
In 2013, the ranking member of the House Financial Services Committee
introduced a bill that would provide for more funding by authorizing a user
tax on investment advisers.50 The tax would be earmarked for investment
adviser examinations and allow for more frequent examinations. Like the
SEC’s requests for more taxpayer funding specifically for increased adviser
examinations, the user fee failed to gain sufficient Congressional support.
Congress’s declining to approve additional funding for examinations or
a user fee to be collected from investment advisers begs the question of
whether a third party examination requirement paid for by advisers is an end
run around Congress. A third party examination rule could be viewed as
indirectly increasing the SEC’s budget by reducing the expenditure of
resources that it otherwise would have incurred. Similarly, advisers’ paying
for third party examinations would be an indirect user fee that is “collected”
by the Commission by reason of the offset against SEC expenditures on
examinations.
However, there is nothing new, of course, about regulators’ adopting
rules that require regulated entities to incur additional costs. Nor is there
anything new about rules that shift expenses to regulated entities that a
regulator might otherwise incur. The SEC’s requirement that investment
advisers retain an accountant to conduct an annual surprise audit illustrates
both points. However, the impetus for that requirement was not, or at least
was not characterized as, inadequate SEC resources. Nor was it adopted in
the face of Congress’s repeated declining to provide additional funding for
surprise audits.
SEC resource constraints have been explicitly cited as the primary
justification for mandating third party investment adviser examinations.

48. See, e.g., Melanie Waddell, SEC’s White Pleads for Advisor Exam Funds; Rep. Waters
‘Pushing Hard’ for User Fees Bill, THINKADVISOR (Apr. 29, 2014), http://www.thinkadvisor.com/
2014/04/29/secs-white-pleads-for-advisor-exam-funds-rep-water.
49. See, e.g., Hensarling-Garrett Letter, supra note 32, at 3 (recommending that the SEC
consider increasing adviser examinations by “reallocate[ing] existing . . . resources” and “consider
creative solutions”).
50. See Investment Adviser Examination Improvement Act of 2013, H.R. 1627, 113th Cong.
(2013) (introduced by Rep. Maxine Waters).
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Chair White has directly connected inadequate funding and the planned move
to third party examinations, reportedly stating that:
[t]he SEC is going to need more funding in order to get out and examine
more registered investment advisers, and will continue to press Congress
for more funding for the agency. However, Ms. White noted that the SEC
will need to ‘move to a program of third-party compliance exams’ for
advisers.51

While the Commission will certainly supplement this justification with
investor protection arguments, the Commission will not be able to contend
that the rule has no cost-savings purpose.
Members of Congress may view the SEC’s rulemaking as a usurpation
of its appropriation and taxation powers. The rule would essentially moot
Congress’s views on whether additional funds should be allocated to the
Commission for advisers’ examinations and on whether investment advisers
should be subject to a user fee. By adopting the rule, the Commission can
take the decision out of Congress’s hands.
Congress has granted the Commission substantial discretion in allocating
its budget among different activities, and the Commission uses that discretion
to hire additional staff to examine advisers.52 Chair White recently announced
that the Commission would shift resources dedicated to broker-dealer
examinations to investment adviser examinations,53 which reflects a solution
to inadequate investment adviser examinations that falls squarely within the
SEC’s traditional authority. Transferring internal expenses to regulated
entities is inconsistent with this approach.
There are many instances in which agencies impose taxes to be used for
the agency’s operations, but Congress expressly authorizes the taxes in these
instances. The most relevant example here is the Financial Industry
Regulatory Authority (FINRA), which imposes fees on broker-dealers that
51. See SIFMA Conference, supra note 13.
52. See Fiscal Year 2017 Budget Request of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission,

Hearing before the Subcomm. on Fin. Servs. & General Gov’t, Comm. on Appropriations (Apr. 12,
2016) (testimony of Chair White) (stating that under FY 2017 budget request, “a top priority will
be to hire 127 additional examiners, primarily to conduct additional examinations of investment
advisers”).
53. See Mark Schoeff, Jr., Shift of SEC Resources to RIA Oversight Not Likely to Stop Push for
Third-Party Exams, INVESTMENT NEWS (Feb. 1, 2016, 1:47 PM), http://www.investmentnews.com/
article/20160201/FREE/160209994/shift-of-sec-resources-to-ria-oversight-not-likely-to-stoppush-for (stating that the Commission plans to increase adviser examiners from 530 to 630 in 2016,
in part by shifting broker-dealer examiners to adviser examinations). To the extent that FINRA
would make up for reduced SEC examinations of broker-dealers, the Commission would be
indirectly imposing additional taxes on the broker-dealers that fund FINRA operations. See id. A
“decrease in the number of SEC staff doing broker exams [probably] will put more pressure on
FINRA to pick up the slack.” Id. Schoeff quotes Skip Schweiss, Managing Director, TD Ameritrade
Institutional: “[t]his is robbing Peter to pay Paul.” Id.; see generally FY 2016 BUDGET REQUEST BY
PROGRAM, supra note 8, at 67 (“[R]egulators are examining well below one percent of the
approximately 160,000 branch offices each year.”).
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directly finance FINRA broker-dealer examinations.54 The Public Company
Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) is authorized to collect fees from
public companies and broker-dealers subject to its oversight, and the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC) sets and collects fees for the purpose
of promoting “universal service.” Challenges to FCC fees on nondelegation
of powers grounds have failed,55 but the case at hand is different. A third
party examination rule would reflect the exercise of undelegated taxation
authority; also, the user fees would not be paid directly to the Commission.
If mandating third party examinations to improve overall compliance is akin
to the FCC’s collecting fees to promote universal service, and assuming that
the FCC could not collect the fees if not delegated the authority to do so, it is
not necessarily clear that the fact that the Commission would not collect the
fee paid for third party examinations (at least not directly) should make a
difference for purposes of the separation of powers.
A related question is how and whether a cost-benefit analysis should
include the shifting of financial responsibility for investment adviser
examinations from the Commission to users of that service. The Commission
could shift enough internal resources to provide for an adequate examination
program, in which case the out-of-pocket cost to advisers would be zero. If
such an examination program could be achieved at zero cost, then would it
necessarily be arbitrary and capricious to impose fees on advisers to obtain a
benefit that could otherwise be obtained for free? If the APA requires the
consideration of alternatives, then how could the alternative of shifting
internal resources to solve the examination program not be considered
superior to a third party examination program?
The courts’ application of cost-benefit principles seems quaintly naïve
when one opens up the cost-benefit inquiry to the full scope of political
economics. For example, the Advisers Act requires the Commission, for
some rulemakings, to “consider . . . whether the [rule] will promote
efficiency, competition, and capital formation.”56 A user tax reflects the
economic theory that the optimal production of a good or service requires
that negative externalities incurred in its production be included in the price
of the good or service.57 The SEC’s expenditures on adviser examinations
represent a negative externality imposed on taxpayers; shifting this expense
to advisers and, thereby, to their advisory clients would internalize the cost
54. See SECTION 914 SEC STUDY, supra note 31, at 25–26 (citing as examples fees collected by
agencies from regulated persons).
55. See, e.g., Tex. Office of Pub. Util. Counsel v. FCC, 183 F.3d 393 (5th Cir. 1999). See
generally Seafarers Int’l Union of N. Am. v. U.S. Coast Guard, 81 F.3d 179 (D.C. Cir. 1996); Nat’l
Cable Television Ass’n, Inc. v. United States, 415 U.S. 336 (1974). In another case, the Supreme
Court did not address PCAOB financing in its decision on the legality of the PCAOB. See PCAOB
Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477 (2010).
56. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(c) (2012).
57. For example, a company that profitably sells widgets for $10 each while causing $20 of
environmental harm per widget is inefficient.
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of investment advice and increase efficiency. Along the same lines,
competition could be promoted by leveling the playing field with brokerdealers, which finance their own examinations through dues paid to FINRA.
Capital formation could thereby be promoted by removing a distortion in the
cost of capital for broker-dealers relative to investment advisers. Yet this
analysis seems outside the bounds of what Congress intended by
considerations of “efficiency, competition and capital formation.” Perhaps
the reason is that this kind of economic analysis is a legislative prerogative
reflected in its taxation/appropriation authority, but it is Congress that
instructed the Commission to consider these factors when promulgating
rules.
A full treatment of the question of whether a third party examination rule
would improperly usurp Congress’s appropriation/taxation authority is
beyond the scope of this Article. However, in theory there must be some point
at which an agency rulemaking is so strongly motivated by the desire to shift
its own expenses to regulated entities and/or to remedy the agency’s
perceived underfunding that the rulemaking is not a permissible exercise of
administrative authority. To date, the SEC’s plan to require third party
examinations appears to offer a suitable candidate for testing this proposition.
Adding fuel to this fire is the added concern that the rulemaking would usurp
Congress’s authority to create an investment adviser SRO, as discussed
immediately below.
C. THIRD PARTY EXAMINERS AS LEGISLATING A DE FACTO
ADVISER SRO
A secondary purpose of the SEC’s planned third party examination rule
appears to be to create indirectly an SRO with examination authority over
investment advisers. Congress authorized SEC approval of SROs for brokerdealers, a role that has been filled by FINRA. However, Congress has
repeatedly considered and declined to authorize an SRO for investment
advisers, which again raises the question of whether an SEC rulemaking
could be viewed as an exercise of legislative power.
Commissioner Gallagher offered his initial third party examination
proposal in the context of a discussion about the need for an adviser SRO.
Indeed, his comments could more fairly be viewed as a call to create an
adviser SRO, with third party examinations being offered as an indirect
means of doing so. Regarding the concern that broker-dealers were subject
to more frequent examinations than investment advisers, he noted that “one
way to address this imbalance would be to provide for third party examiners
of investment advisors—including, potentially, defining the term ‘third
party’ to include SROs in order to allow the SROs currently involved in
broker-dealer oversight to conduct examinations of ‘dual hatted’ investment
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advisors as well.”58 Commissioner Gallagher complained, “[w]e have no
[FINRA CEO] Rick Ketchum on the adviser side and no SRO. We are sitting
there with our chins out, waiting to get pummeled.”59
Commissioner Gallagher’s position reflects longstanding SEC support
for establishing an adviser SRO.60 In 1963, it recommended that registered
investment advisers be required to be members of an SRO,61 and in 1976 it
asked Congress for the authority to conduct a study of the feasibility of this
option.62 In 1983, it requested comment on designating an SRO for mutual
funds and their advisers that would have only inspection authority,63 and in
1989 the SEC recommended to Congress that it grant the Commission the
authority to designate one or more adviser SROs.64 That same year, bills were
introduced in the House and Senate that would have granted the Commission
such authority,65 and four years later the House passed a bill that would have
created an inspection-only SRO for all registered investment advisers.66 None
of the efforts reached fruition. In 2003, the Commission requested comment
on the creation of an SRO for advisers, but that did not lead to any proposal.67
In 2012, the Chairman of the House Financial Services Committee
introduced the Investment Adviser Oversight Act of 2012, which would have
required advisers to be members of an SEC-approved SRO.68 This effort
failed, but some members of Congress continue to express interest in an
adviser SRO.69
58. 2014 Gallagher Remarks, supra note 7 (internal citation omitted).
59. Schoeff, Jr., supra note 10.
60. See generally Compliance Programs of Investment Companies and Investment Advisers,

Advisers Act Release No. 2107, 79 SEC Docket 1696 (Feb. 5, 2003) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 270,
275).
61. See REPORT OF SPECIAL STUDY OF SECURITIES MARKETS OF THE SEC, H.R. DOC. NO. 8895, pt. 4, 722 (1963).
62. See S. REP. NO. 94-910, at 10 (1976). A similar bill was considered by the Senate but did
not pass. See SECTION 914 SEC STUDY, supra note 31, at n.54.
63. See Concept of Utilizing Private Entities in Investment Company Examinations and
Imposing Examination Fees, Investment Company Act Release No. 13,044 (Feb. 23, 1983)
(codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 270 (2016)).
64. See Compliance Programs of Investment Companies and Investment Advisers, Advisers Act
Release No. 2107, 79 SEC Docket 1696, at text accompanying n.71.
65. See S. 1410, 101st Cong. (1989); H.R. 3054, 101st Cong. (1989).
66. H.R. 578, 103rd Cong. (1993).
67. See Compliance Programs of Investment Companies and Investment Advisers, Investment
Company Act Release No. 25,925, Part II.E(3) (Feb. 5, 2003) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 270,
205).
68. See H.R. 4624, 112th Cong. (2012). See generally David Tittsworth, H.R. 4624: The Pitfalls
of a Self-Regulatory Organization for Investment Advisers and Why User Fees Would Better
Accomplish the Goal of Investment Adviser Accountability, 87 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 477 (2013);
Mercer Bullard, The New Self-Regulator for Advisors: A Taxing Affair for Small Businesses and
Small Investors, MORNINGSTAR (May 10, 2012), http://www.morningstar.com/advisor/t/56178352/
the-new-self-regulator-for-advisors-a-taxing-affair-for-small-businesses-and-small-investors.htm.
69. See Arthur Postal, Congressman Wants FINRA To Examine Investment Advisors, INS. NEWS
NET (May 29, 2015), http://insurancenewsnet.com/innarticle/congressman-wants-finra-to-examine
-investment-advisors (“Rep. French Hill, R-Ark., said he is considering legislation that would give
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The impression that the Commission views third party examinations as a
proxy for an adviser SRO is reinforced by its coupling of the two concepts in
the past. For example, in 2003, it requested comment on various options
whereby it could “rely more heavily on the private sector.”70 The two most
prominent options were (1) “to require each fund and adviser to undergo
periodic compliance reviews by a third party that would produce a report of
its findings and recommendations,” and/or (2) to form “one or more selfregulatory organizations (SROs) for funds and/or advisers.”71 The request
for comment was partly prompted by declining examination resources
relative to industry growth,72 similar to the impetus for the current interest in
mandating third party examinations.
One might argue that Congressional action should be viewed as
necessary only to create an SRO modeled on the Exchange Act’s SRO
provisions, which grants rulemaking, examination, prosecutorial, and
adjudicative powers. Perhaps an SRO with only examination authority should
be within the SEC’s power. However, the Commission has previously
recommended legislation that would have authorized precisely the
examination-only SROs for advisers that a third party examination rule
would mirror.73 Congress declined to create such an SRO. The fact that the
Commission asked Congress to create an examination-only SRO for advisers
implies that it believes it lacks the authority do so itself.
The taint of rent-seeking may exacerbate the impression that the
Commission is usurping Congressional authority. Broker-dealers that
compete with investment advisers would gain a competitive benefit if
investment advisers’ operating expenses were increased.74 FINRA would
benefit by increasing its turf from being placed in a strong competitive
position to act as a third party examiner for advisers.75 Both broker-dealers
FINRA authority to examine investment advisors. He said his motivation for doing so is to increase
the percentage of advisors examined annually.”).
70. See Compliance Programs of Investment Companies and Investment Advisers, Investment
Company Act Release No. 25,925, at Part II.E.
71. Id. at Parts II.E.1 & 3 (emphasis added). The other options were “to require investment
advisers to obtain fidelity bonds from insurance companies” and “to expand the role of independent
public accountants that audit fund financial statements to include an examination of fund
compliance controls.” Id. at 1704.
72. The Commission claimed that, by using third party examination “reports to identify quickly
areas that required attention,” it could “increase the frequency with which [its] staff could examine
funds and advisers.” Id. at Part II.E.1. Conversely, “[f]unds and advisers with reports indicating that
they have effective compliance programs could be examined less frequently, which would reduce
the burdens on them of undergoing more frequent examination by our staff.” Id.
73. See SECTION 914 SEC STUDY, supra note 31, at n.54.
74. This benefit would arguably only level the playing field, however, as broker-dealers
currently fund FINRA examinations through fees paid to FINRA. See FIN. INDUS. REGULATORY
AUTH., FINRA 2015 YEAR IN REVIEW AND ANNUAL FINANCIAL REPORT 19 (2016),
http://www.finra.org/sites/default/files/2015_YIR_AFR.pdf.
75. Cf. Letter from David G. Tittsworth, President & Chief Exec. Officer, Inv. Adviser Ass’n,
to Comm’r Gallagher (June 9, 2014) (citing report finding that approximately 81% of advisers prefer
SEC over FINRA oversight).
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and FINRA have strongly supported creating an investment adviser SRO and
would benefit from a third party adviser examination mandate.
A full analysis of the SEC’s authority to create a de facto examinationonly adviser SRO is, again, beyond the scope of this Article. Like the
taxation/appropriation argument discussed supra, this claim ultimately may
have no purchase. The surprise audit requirement creates a narrow form of
examiner SRO for advisers, but that rulemaking has not been viewed as a
usurpation of Congressional authority. There are significant differences
between the SRO model and a third party examination requirement. A third
party examination rule probably would allow investment advisers broad
discretion to choose their examiner, whereas the SRO model has proved illequipped to offer more than one SRO option.76 Another distinguishing factor
is that it is unlikely that third party examiners would be required to register
with the Commission. These differences make the usurpation of
Congressional authority argument far less compelling. But the strong
connections between third party adviser examiners and an adviser SRO, in
combination with the power of the taxation/appropriation argument
discussed supra, would make a third party examination rule an appealing
opportunity to test the limits of the SEC’s authority and the power of the
Fourth Branch.
III. THIRD PARTY EXAMINATION MODELS
The use of third party examiners is not a novel concept. For decades,
Congress and the Commission have applied a third party examiner model in
a variety of contexts. The most prominent example is the reliance on public
accounting firms to audit public company financial statements in order to
satisfy a variety of legal requirements. Federal law long relied on credit
ratings provided by NRSROs to satisfy legal mandates relating to the
creditworthiness of issuers. For decades, SROs have operated as a kind of
third party examiner, including FINRA, which has primary regulatory
authority over hundreds of thousands of registered representatives who are
also associated with a registered investment adviser.77
Some of these models rely on private parties not only to evaluate
regulated entities’ compliance, but also, in varying degrees, to legislate,
police, and adjudicate substantive standards and punish violators. Private
actors control much of the Fourth Branch. These private oversight models
have experienced varied success. After the collapse of WorldCom and Enron
in 2002, Congress substantially revised the regulation of public company
audits, including the creation of the PCAOB.78 The Financial Crisis of 2008
76. See 15 U.S.C. § 78o (2012) (authorizing the Commission to approve an SRO for brokerdealers). FINRA is the only SRO that has been created under the Exchange Act.
77. See SECTION 914 SEC STUDY, supra note 31, at 37.
78. See, e.g., Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (Sarbanes-Oxley), Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 7211–19, 7231–34 (2012)).
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led to Congress’s substantially curtailing the third party examination role of
NRSROs.79
Third party examiners play a significant role in the investment adviser
space. The Commission has directly or indirectly used third party investment
adviser examiners in the form of NRSRO ratings, outsourced CCO services,
mandatory custody audits, proxy firms’ recommendations, appointed
compliance consultants, and investment performance standard setters.
Additionally, many advisers use third parties to draft and evaluate their
compliance policies, incorporate third party systems in their day-to-day
compliance procedures, and retain third parties to conduct compliance audits.
The SEC staff has directly or indirectly afforded a degree of credence to these
third party arrangements when conducting inspections.
This part of the Article discusses certain third party examination models.
They vary greatly and reflect a broad interpretation of the concept of a third
party examination. For example, the CFA Institute produces the GIPS but
does not examine compliance with its requirements. The CFA Institute is a
kind of third party examiner by reason of the GIPS’ comprising a third party
source of law by which securities law compliance may be evaluated.
Like the CFA Institute, proxy firms and NRSROs establish conduct
standards that assume a kind of legal status. Unlike the Institute, they also
evaluate whether those standards have been met, and both are unusual in that
it is generally not the examinee whose regulatory compliance is at issue.
NRSROs and proxy firms both “examine” issuers, but other parties, such as
investment advisers, use their findings for compliance purposes. None of
these three examiners formally reports its findings to the Commission,
although NRSROs’ ratings are publicly disclosed and proxy firms’
recommendations are often widely available.
Public company auditors, and auditors that conduct surprise audits and/or
produce internal control reports pursuant to the Custody Rule, fit a more
conventional model of a third party examiner. They examine their
examinees’ compliance with legal rules, although only a narrow set thereof.
Unlike users of the GIPS, proxy firms, and NRSROs, examinees are required
to retain an independent auditor to attest to their compliance. Auditors’
findings are, to a greater or lesser extent, formally reported to the
Commission.
Compliance consultants resemble what a third party examiner might look
like under a third party examination rule for investment advisers. Compliance
consultants typically are hired as a condition of an investment adviser’s
settlement of an SEC enforcement action. Their mandate is usually much
broader than that of an auditor in that they may examine for compliance for
a variety of rules. Like auditors, they formally report their findings and
79. See, e.g., Dodd-Frank, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 931–939H, 124 Stat. 1376, 1872 (2010)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of U.S.C.)).
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recommendations to the Commission. They are different from other third
party examiners, however, in that they do not play an ongoing role. Once the
examination has been completed, the engagement terminates.
CCO’s represent a hybrid third party examiner model in that the CCO
can be an internal employee or an outside firm. In most cases, the CCO is an
employee of the adviser and frequently serves in other roles as well. These
CCOs are third parties only in the very broad sense that they represent a ruledefined, externally sourced presence and function in relation to an investment
adviser’s compliance.
Many firms retain third parties to act as their CCO, in which case the
CCO’s function may closely resemble the role that an SEC mandated third
party examiner might play under a third party examiner rule. The CCO
requirement for mutual funds offers some interesting twists on the general
CCO requirement under the Advisers Act, including independent control
over the CCO’s hiring, firing, and compensation.
This set of third party examiner models is by no means exhaustive, but it
comprises models that will, or at least should, strongly influence an SEC third
party examiner rulemaking. There are inconsistencies across different models
that a third party examiner rule would have to resolve. A third party examiner
rulemaking may even lead the Commission to reconsider rules for some of
these preexisting models. The purpose of the following discussion is to
provide a useful starting point for this analysis.
A. NATIONALLY RECOGNIZED STATISTICAL RATINGS
ORGANIZATIONS
The NRSRO model offers a uniquely rich history from which to draw in
considering a third party examiner rule. In response to loud and fairly
constant criticism after each of the last two financial crises, NRSRO
regulations have been repeatedly reevaluated and reformed. NRSROs are
also unique in that they have, at times, held far more power than other
examiners. Finally, NRSROs are special because, to a large extent, they are
perceived to have failed as third party examiners. The history of NRSROs’
fall from grace as third party examiners provides important lessons for a third
party examiner rule.
The NRSRO model reflects a particularly strong form of third party
compliance services. The NRSRO itself establishes the relevant legal
requirement, which in this case is a level of creditworthiness that satisfies an
applicable credit rating. For example, in the past a money market fund would
not satisfy applicable creditworthiness requirements if its portfolio securities
did not satisfy NRSRO rating standards.80 Money market fund regulation has
80. Rule 2a-7 under the Investment Company Act sets forth various diversification, maturity
and creditworthiness requirements for money market funds. See 17 C.F.R. § 270.2a-7 (2016).
Mutual fund compliance is, in effect, accomplished by the fund’s sponsor, and the sponsor is usually
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essentially assigned NRSROs the role of quasi-rule makers in that they have
determined the standards pursuant to which a form of legal compliance is
measured. As of 2002, NRSRO ratings were being used as benchmarks in at
least eight federal statutes, forty-seven federal regulations, and more than one
hundred state laws and regulations.81
Credit ratings as a source of law are very different from, for example,
rules under the Advisers Act. One reason is that no entity is legally required
to obtain a rating or be assigned any particular rating grade. Yet ratings have
legal authority because a security receiving a particular rating permits many
types of investors to purchase that security in compliance with the law.
Another reason is that the person inspected, the issuer, is not the person
whose legal compliance is at issue. In contrast, under a third party examiner
rule, examiners would examine for compliance with rules that apply directly
to the advisers they examine.
A second source of NRSRO power lies in its exclusive role as an
examiner. The NRSRO, and only the NRSRO, gathers and analyzes issuer
information to evaluate the issuer’s initial and continuing satisfaction of a
rating standard. As examiner, the NRSRO has even been afforded quasigovernmental status by the Commission, through granting them special
access to confidential issuer information. The Commission previously
exempted issuers from Regulation FD disclosure restrictions with respect to
information they provide to NRSROs.82
A third source of NRSRO power is its exclusive enforcement and judicial
authority. An NRSRO has exclusive authority to “prosecute” an issuer found,
through examination, to have failed to sustain the creditworthiness necessary
to keep a rating and to adjudicate that prosecution by deciding whether to
downgrade an issuer’s securities.83 A downgrade may lead to immediate
noncompliance on the part of entities that own the securities.
Historically, NRSROs have been unaccountable for the exercise of their
power. There is no higher authority to which their ratings may be appealed.
Laws and rules that use ratings as proxies for creditworthiness generally do
not provide for practicable substitutes. The Commission generally has not
revoked or conditioned its granting of NRSRO status on NRSROs’ ratings
decisions. In 2002, Congress expressly prohibited the Commission from
regulating the “substance of credit ratings” or the “procedures or
methodologies” used to determine them.84
the fund’s investment adviser. See Mutual Funds Guide, 2010 WL 11248679 (2010) (mutual funds
are externally managed). Thus, mutual fund rules are generally a form of de facto investment adviser
regulation. Mutual Funds Guide, 2010 WL 11248679 (2010).
81. S. REP. NO. 107-75, at 100 (2002).
82. See 17 C.F.R. § 243.100(b)(2)(iii). This exemption was repealed pursuant to Section 938B
of the Dodd-Frank Act.
83. See S. REP. NO. 107-75, at 106–07 (describing rating systems).
84. Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006 (CRARA), Pub. L. No. 109-291, § 4(a), 120 Stat.
1332 (2006) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7(c)(2) (2012)).
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NRSROs have been relatively immune to public and private liability.
They have been exempt from private liability under Section 11 of the
Securities Act of 1933 and have successfully claimed that, in any event, their
opinions are protected First Amendment speech.85 One court went so far as
to grant a NRSRO’s communications with an issuer the privilege afforded to
journalists in denying a production request.86 Courts have found that
NRSROs could not be treated as a “seller” under Section 12 of the Securities
Act or be subject to control person liability.87 NRSROs have generally been
susceptible only to claims of fraud or intentional misrepresentation, but even
then at least one court has found that their conflicts of interest are so well
known that omitting disclosure of them was not a material omission.88
Understanding the scope of NRSROs’ third party examiner power is an
important backdrop for reviewing how their third party examiner role has
been regulated. Over the last two decades, the regulation of NRSROs has
undergone a dramatic change not only in degree, but also in kind. Today,
NRSRO ratings have been stripped of their legal force under federal law and
rules. The uniquely broad power of NRSROs must be kept in mind when
evaluating the current state of NRSRO regulation relative to the regulation of
other third party examiner models.
Credit ratings have long played a role in regulation, but it was the
Commission that created the concept of a formally approved NRSRO. In
1975, the Commission was concerned regarding how broker-dealers were
implementing minimum capital requirements under the SEC’s net capital
rule.89 To address its concerns, the SEC took the position that it would not
recommend an enforcement action if a broker-dealer used a credit rating
agency’s ratings in applying the net capital rule, if the Commission had
designated the agency as an NRSRO. The regulatory role of NRSROs
snowballed from there.90
Over the years, reliance on ratings issued by NRSROs expanded to a host
of federal and state, statutory and regulatory provisions.91 The growing role
of NRSROs prompted the Commission to issue, in 1994, a concept release
soliciting comments on the role of NRSROs and the need to regulate them.92

85. See S. REP. NO. 107-75, at 104–05, 123–24.
86. See In re Pan Am Corp., 161 B.R. 577, 581–83 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (quashing subpoena to

NRSRO based on qualified journalist’s privilege because “S&P functions as a journalist when
gathering information in connection with its ratings process”).
87. See THOMAS LEE HAZEN, REGULATION OF SEC. RATINGS AGENCIES, TREATISE ON THE
LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION 14:184 (2016).
88. See id.
89. See S. REP. NO. 107-75, at 101.
90. See id.
91. See id.
92. See Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations, Exchange Act Release No.
34,616, 59 Fed. Reg. 46,314 (Aug. 31, 1994).
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In 1997, the Commission proposed a rule that would have defined “NRSRO,”
but the rule was never adopted.93
Then came the Enron-WorldCom scandals of 2002. Congress was
nonplussed that NRSROs had rated Enron as a good credit risk just four days
before it declared the then largest bankruptcy in U.S. history.94 Much of
Congress’s wrath was vented on the accounting industry, but it also had a
number of concerns about NRSROs, including: credit rating agencies’ role in
evaluating issuers, their importance in the securities markets, impediments to
accurate ratings, barriers to entry to the credit rating business, their conflicts
of interest, and the public availability of information regarding the credit
rating process.95 Congress required the Commission to conduct a study of
credit rating agencies that addressed these concerns.96
Additionally, a 2002 Senate Staff Report found that the NRSROs’
evaluation lacked diligence, in part due to their lack of legal accountability.97
The Report recommended that the Commission establish rating and training
standards for NRSROs and examine them for compliance with those
standards.98 However, the Commission did not act on the Report’s
recommendations. The Senate Staff Report identified a range of issues for
further consideration,99 many of which were the subject of a subsequently
issued SEC concept release,100 but the Commission took no further action.
Congress took the next step by enacting the Credit Rating Agency
Reform Act of 2006 (CRARA),101 which dramatically expanded the
regulation of NRSROs. CRARA defined the term “nationally recognized
statistical rating organization,” which definition included the requirements
that an NRSRO had been in operation for at least three years and be registered
with the Commission.102 Congress required that the registration application
be made publicly available and include: the applicant’s “credit ratings
performance measurement statistics;” “procedures and methodologies” used
in determining ratings; any conflict of interest relating to the issuance of the
ratings; and, on a confidential basis, a list of rated issuers and revenues
93. See Capital Requirements for Brokers or Dealers Under the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, Exchange Act Release No. 39,457, 62 Fed. Reg. 68,018 (Dec. 30, 1994).
94. Rating the Raters: Enron and the Credit Rating Agencies, Hearings Before the S. Comm. on
Governmental Affairs, 107th Cong. 4 (2002) (statement of Senator Thompson).
95. See Sarbanes-Oxley, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 702(a), 116 Stat. 745 (codified as amended at
15 U.S.C. §§ 7211–19, 7231–34 (2012)).
96. Id. § 702(b).
97. See S. REP. NO. 107-75, at 104–05 (2002).
98. Id. at 127.
99. See S. REP. NO. 107-75, at 125–27.
100. See generally Rating Agencies and the Use of Credit Ratings under the Federal Securities
Laws, Exchange Act Release No. 47,972, Investment Company Release No. 26,066, 80 SEC Docket
1003 (June 4, 2003).
101. CRARA, Pub. L. No. 109-291, 120 Stat. 1332 (codified in scattered sections of the U.S.C.).
102. Oversight of Credit Rating Agencies Registered as Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating
Organizations, Exchange Act Release No. 55,857, 72 Fed. Reg. 33,564, 33,572 (June 18, 2007).
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received from them in the preceding fiscal year.103 CRARA authorized the
Commission to deny an agency’s application if it found that the agency did
“not have adequate financial and managerial resources to consistently
produce credit ratings with integrity and to materially comply with the
procedures and methodologies disclosed . . . . “104 An NRSRO agency was
required annually to certify its registration and to update it upon the
occurrence of any material changes.105
CRARA required that NRSROs establish written policies and procedures
to address conflicts of interest, and that the Commission adopt rules
prohibiting or requiring the management and disclosure of conflicts. CRARA
deemed such conflicts to include those relating to the way in which issuers
compensate the NRSRO, consulting or other services provided by the
NRSRO to the issuer, and any other business relationships between the
NRSRO and the issuer.106 CRARA also required NRSROs to designate a
compliance officer.107
CRARA further authorized the Commission to prohibit “unfair, coercive
or abusive” conduct by NRSROs.108 It listed the following types of conduct
as candidates for such rules:
1. Conditioning or threatening to condition ratings on the issuer’s
purchase of other NRSRO services or products (e.g., “pre-credit
rating assessment product”);
2. Lowering or threatening to lower a rating or refusing to rate
instruments issued by an asset pool unless the NRSRO rated all
of the instruments in the pool; and
3. Modifying or threatening to modify a rating or otherwise
departing from the NRSRO’s policies and methodologies based
on whether the issuer purchased the rating or any other NRSRO
service or product.109
CRARA granted the Commission recordkeeping, reporting, and examination
authority over NRSROs and the authority to assess penalties for violations,
and further required the Commission to submit an annual report to Congress
on NRSRO registrations and the SEC’s views “on the state of competition,
transparency, and conflicts of interest among [NRSROs].”110 CRARA
expressly stated that it created no private cause of action, including no cause
of action under Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,111 but
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

CRARA § 4(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7(a)(3) (2012) (requiring public availability).
Id., 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7(a)(2)(C)(ii)(I)).
See id., 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7(b)(2)).
See id., 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7(h)(2)).
See id., 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7(j)).
Id., 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7(i)).
See id., 15 U.S.C. §§ 78o-7(i)(1)(A), (B), (C)).
CRARA § 6.
See CRARA § 4(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7(m)).
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CRARA provided, through mandatory public disclosure, grist for private
claims based on fraud of misrepresentation.
The NRSROs’ fall from grace continued in the early stages of the
Financial Crisis of 2008, when three prominent groups issued reports
recommending the removal of the imprimatur of regulatory approval from
various regulations.112 The Commission agreed with the groups’ concern that
including ratings in various rules implied an “official seal of approval’” for
ratings “that could adversely affect the quality of [ratings-related] due
diligence and investment analysis.”113 In July 2008, it proposed to remove
references to NRSRO ratings from certain SEC regulations and forms.114
Before the Commission could take final action on most of these
proposals,115 Congress required that it do so in Section 939A of the DoddFrank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (DoddFrank).116 Dodd-Frank also removed NRSRO references in other federal laws
and rules,117 amplified many of the requirements CRARA had imposed, and

112. See, e.g., Memorandum from Henry M. Paulson Jr., on the President’s Working Group on
Financial Markets, Policy Statement on Financial Market Developments (Mar. 13, 2008),
https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/finmkts/Documents/pwgpolicystatemktturmoil_03122008.pdf; FIN. STABILITY FORUM, THE REPORT
OF THE FINANCIAL STABILITY FORUM ON ENHANCING MARKET AND INSTITUTIONAL RESILIENCE
(2008), http://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/r_0804.pdf?page_moved=1; TECH. COMM. OF THE
INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’NS, CONSULTATION REPORT: THE ROLE OF CREDIT RATING AGENCIES
IN STRUCTURED FINANCE MARKETS (2008), http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD
263.pdf.
113. References to Ratings of Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations,
Investment Company Act Release No. 28,327 (July 1, 2008) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 270,
275).
114. See id. (proposing to remove NRSRO references in six rules under the Investment Company
and Advisers Acts); Security Ratings, Securities Act Release No. 8940 (July 1, 2008) (to be codified
at 17 C.F.R. pts. 229, 230, 239, 240) (proposing to remove NRSRO references in Forms S-3, S-4,
F-3, F-4, and F-9, and Rules 138, 168, and 169, and Regulation AB under the Securities Act; Form
F-3 under the Exchange Act); References to Ratings of Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating
Organizations, Exchange Act Release No. 58,070 (July 1, 2008) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts.
240, 242, 249) (proposing to remove NRSRO references in Rules 3a1-1, 10b-10, 15c3-1, and 15c33, Rules 101 and 102 of Regulation M, Regulation ATS, and Forms ATS-R, PILOT, and X-17A-5
Part IIB).
115. The Commission adopted amendments eliminating a small number of NRSRO references,
but deferred action on most. See References to Ratings of Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating
Organizations, Exchange Act Release No. 60,789 (Oct. 5, 2009) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts.
240, 242, 249, 270).
116. Pursuant to this mandate, the Commission adopted rules removing references to NRSRO
ratings in 2011 and 2013. See Removal of Certain References to Credit Ratings under the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, Exchange Act Release No. 71,194 (Dec. 27, 2013) (to be codified at 17
C.F.R. pts. 240, 249); Removal of Certain References to Credit Ratings Under the Investment
Company Act, Investment Company Act Release No. 30,847 (Dec. 27, 2013) (to be codified at 17
C.F.R. pts. 239, 270, 274). Section 939A of the Dodd-Frank Act also required other federal agencies
to remove NRSRO references in their rules. See Security Ratings, Securities Act Release No. 9245
(July 27, 2011) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 229, 230, 232, 239, 240, 249).
117. Dodd-Frank, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 939, 124 Stat. 1376 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§ 80b-6(4) (2012)).
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removed many protections and freedoms that NRSROs had historically
enjoyed.
Dodd-Frank mandated a number of measures directed at NRSROs’
internal compliance. It required NRSROs to establish an effective internal
control structure and submit reports on their control structure to the
Commission.118 An NRSRO must report to the Commission instances in
which a person involved in the ratings process subsequently became
employed by a rated issuer.119 Dodd-Frank required NRSROs to establish
procedures for the handling and retention of complaints.120 It even turned
NRSROs into a kind of government informant by imposing an affirmative
duty to report credible information provided by a third party that alleges a
material violation of law by a rated issuer.121
Dodd-Frank enhanced the role of quasi-third party examiners by
expanding the role of NRSRO compliance officers and the independence and
responsibilities of NRSRO boards. It required that independent directors with
five-year, nonrenewable terms comprise at least half of an NRSRO’s board,
the independent directors’ compensation not be linked to the “business
performance” of the NRSRO, and be structured so as to ensure independence,
and for the board to include users of ratings.122 It also assigned an NRSRO’s
board with specific oversight responsibilities as to the NRSRO’s ratings
process, its policies and procedures designed to manage and disclose
conflicts of interest, the effectiveness of its internal control systems, and its
compensation and promotion policies.123
As to NRSRO compliance personnel, Dodd-Frank prohibited the
compensation of an NRSRO compliance officer from being linked to the
NRSRO’s financial performance and required that it be structured so as to
ensure independence.124 An NRSRO’s designated compliance officer must
submit an annual compliance report to the NRSRO and the Commission.125
Under Dodd-Frank’s mandated rules, the Commission prohibited NRSRO
personnel engaged in ratings activities from also engaging in sales and
marketing activities, and forbade compliance officers from participating in
either.126

118. See id. § 932, 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7(h)(5).
119. Section 15E of Dodd-Frank was amended to require NRSROs to report to the Commission

any case of a person being employed by a rated issuer within the preceding five years if that person
was, within twelvemonths prior to such employment as a senior officer of the NRSRO, a person
who participated in determining ratings or a supervisor of such a person. See id. § 932(a), 15 U.S.C.
§ 78o-7(h)(5)(A)).
120. See id.
121. Id. § 934, 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7(u)).
122. See id. § 934, 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7(t)(2)).
123. See id. § 932.
124. See id.
125. See id.
126. See id.
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Dodd-Frank countered CRARA’s position on NRSRO private liability
by removing the NRSRO exemption from liability under Section 11.127 It
established a pleading standard for private claims against NRSROs under the
Exchange Act128 and eliminated NRSROs’ Regulation FD exemption.129
Dodd-Frank expanded enforcement penalties to match those applicable to
public company auditors, established penalties for persons associated with an
NRSRO, and added a failure to supervise to the category of punishable
conduct.130
Dodd-Frank includes a number of provisions that substantially expanded
the SEC’s role as NRSRO regulator. It requires that the Commission review
each NRSRO’s code of ethics and conflicts of interest policy annually and
when materially amended.131 It also requires examinations of the examiner
by mandating that a newly created SEC Office of Credit Ratings conduct an
annual inspection of every NRSRO.132
In addition to receiving both annual reports from NRSROs on their
internal controls and notices of conflicts created by NRSRO personnel being
employed by rated issuers, the Commission was required by Dodd-Frank to
publish an annual public report summarizing its examination findings and
responses by NRSROs to identified material deficiencies. It also required
SEC studies on the feasibility and desirability of requiring standardization of
various aspects of the ratings system and independence of NRSROs, and
Government Accountability Office studies on compensation models for
NRSROs that would create incentives to provide more accurate ratings and
the feasibility and merits of establishing a professional oversight body for
credit ratings analysts employed by NRSROs.133
The SEC’s expanded role included provisions that, in effect,
compromised CRARA’s prohibition against substantive SEC interference in
NRSROs’ ratings determinations. For example, it required the Commission
to issue rules designed to ensure that NRSRO analysts have adequate
training, experience, and competence, and are tested for “knowledge of the
127. See id. § 939G (declaring 17 C.F.R. § 230.436(g) to have no force or effect).
128. Dodd-Frank Section 933 provides that the pleading standard for a private claim under the

Exchange shall be satisfied if the plaintiff states,

with particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the credit rating agency
knowingly or recklessly failed (i) to conduct a reasonable investigation of the rated
security with respect the factual elements relied upon by its own methodology for
evaluating credit risk or (ii) to obtain reasonable verification of such factual elements
from sources that are independent of the issuer and deemed competent by the NRSRO.
Id. § 933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78u-4(m), 78u-4(b)(2).
129. Id. § 939B.
130. Id. § 932.
131. See id.
132. See id.
133. Id. §§ 939(H) (standardization), 939C (independence), 939D (alternative compensation
models), 939E (professional organization).
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credit rating process.”134 Dodd-Frank required the Commission to extend
NRSROs’ historical performance reporting to multiple years and to consider
whether an NRSRO has failed to produce accurate ratings over a sustained
period.135
Dodd-Frank established further direct or indirect substantive standards
for the determination of credit ratings in other respects. For example, it
required NRSROs to adopt written policies and procedures that assess the
probability that an issuer will default.136 It also required NRSROs to identify
and define symbols used to denote a rating and apply any such symbols “in a
manner that is consistent for all types of securities and money market
instruments for which the symbol is used.”137
Dodd-Frank’s transformation of the role and power of NRSROs was
extraordinary. In 2006, NRSROs were virtually unregulated, unaccountable
arbiters of creditworthiness in the U.S. market for purposes of dozens of
legally enforceable standards. Only four years later, they were converted to
closely examined, quasi-governmental utilities subject to significant public
and private liability risk, with no authority to dictate creditworthiness for
purposes of federal laws and rules and substantially narrowed discretion to
determine how and what ratings were assigned.
B. PROXY ADVISORY FIRMS
Proxy advisory firms provide advice on how to vote company proxies,
most typically to investment advisers and institutional investors who are
responsible for voting proxies on their advisory clients’ behalf. In many
respects they are similar to NRSROs. They establish the standards by which
management proposals are evaluated,138 examine the proposals by applying
their standards, and act as prosecutor and judge by vetting the results of their
examination internally and issuing judgments on how shareholders should
vote. They have virtually no direct accountability for their recommendations,
in part because their recommendations are essentially opinions, but probably
also because it would be extremely difficult to show that their opinions,
unlike NRSRO ratings, caused investor losses.
There is generally no express legal requirement that an adviser obtain
third party proxy recommendations, just as there has not been such a
requirement for an issuer to obtain a bond rating. Also, although a proxy
firm’s recommendation serves a compliance purpose, it has not been formally
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

Id. § 936.
See id. § 932.
See id. § 938.
See id.
See Examining the Market Power and Impact of Proxy Advisory Firms, Hearing before the
Subcomm. On Capital Mkts. and Gov’t Sponsored Enters., Comm. On Fin. Servs., 113th Cong. 189
(2013) [hereinafter Proxy Firms Hearing] (former SEC Chairman Harvey L. Pitt stating: “ISS and
Glass Lewis have become the de facto standard setters for corporate governance policies in the
U.S.”).
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adopted as legally sufficient.139 Advisers who rely on proxy firm
recommendations are ultimately responsible for ensuring that their reliance
is reasonable. The market for proxy advice has been even more concentrated
than the market for NRSROs; two proxy firms dominate their market:
Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) and Glass Lewis & Co.140
Proxy firms are also very different from NRSROs. Proxy firms are paid
for their recommendations by persons responsible for voting on proposals
rather than by the companies that seek their approval. These companies do
pay proxy firms, however, for services that include advice on policies and
activities that are the subject of proxy votes.141 Proxy firms are also different
because their opinions are not limited to management proposals; they also
provide recommendations on shareholder proposals and provide consulting
services to activist shareholders. In contrast, an NRSRO provides opinions
only on issuers’ securities.
Proxy firms’ influence is substantial.142 Their influence may be
attributable to their role in helping investment fiduciaries fulfill their legal
duties to clients with respect to their management of client assets. The
Department of Labor (DOL) has a longstanding position that managers of
retirement funds have a fiduciary duty to vote proxies in the best interests of
beneficiaries.143 The Commission similarly takes the view that an investment
adviser has a fiduciary duty to vote proxies in its clients’ best interests.144 In
2003, the Commission required mutual funds to disclose how they vote
proxies, partly in response to the view that mutual funds were “passive
investors.”145 The Commission also adopted an antifraud rule that required
139. One scenario in which a third party recommendation is both dispositive and mandatory arises
under the Bank Holding Company Act, which may require outsourcing a shareholder’s vote if the
ownership stake could be viewed as a controlling interest. See Susanne Craig & Jessica SilverGreenberg, Small Firm Could Turn the Vote on Dimon, N.Y. TIMES (May 7, 2013, 8:08 AM),
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/05/07/small-firm-could-turn-the-vote-on-dimon/?_r=0 (stating
that as required by the Act, BlackRock outsourced voting to third party regarding separation of
chairman and CEO positions at JP Morgan).
140. Id.
141. Twenty-nine percent of governance business revenues were attributable to corporate
services. MSCI INC., FORM 10-K ANNUAL REPORT PURSUANT TO SECTION 13 OR 15(D) OF THE
SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 10 (2014).
142. See, e.g., David Larcker, Allan McCall & Gaizka Ormazabal, Outsourcing Shareholder
Voting to Proxy Advisory Firms, 58 J.L. & ECON. 173 (2015) (finding that proxy firms’
recommendations substantial affect on say-on-pay voting outcomes and changes in compensation
proposals between recommendations and votes; and that firms’ influence is negatively correlated
with stock market performance); see Proxy Firms Hearing, supra note 138, at 189 (testimony of
former SEC Chairman Harvey L. Pitt stating that ISS and Glass Lewis control 97% of the proxy
market and citing an estimate that they control 38% of the shareholder vote).
143. See Interpretive Bulletin Relating to Exercise of Shareholder Rights. 73 Fed. Reg. 61,731 at
n.1 (Oct. 17, 2008) (codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 2509).
144. See Proxy Voting by Investment Advisers, Advisers Act Release No. 2106, 79 SEC Docket
1673 (Jan. 31, 2003).
145. Compliance Programs of Investment Companies and Investment Advisers, Advisers Act
Release No. 2107, 79 SEC Docket 1696, at text accompanying n.4 (Feb. 5, 2003) (codified at 17
C.F.R. pts. 270, 275).
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investment advisers to implement written policies and procedures that were
designed to ensure that they voted proxies in their clients’ best interests.146
Both the DOL’s and SEC’s positions have created incentives for advisers
to minimize liability risk by offloading proxy voting decisions to expert
proxy firms. The Commission has implicitly acknowledged that using a
proxy firm can provide a kind of safe harbor.147 For example, the Commission
has stated “an adviser could demonstrate that the vote was not a product of a
conflict of interest if it voted client securities, in accordance with a
predetermined policy, based upon the recommendations of an independent
third party.”148 Former SEC Commissioner Gallagher described this safe
harbor as “akin to what the Commission had earlier done with credit rating
agencies – essentially, mandating the use of third party opinions.”149
Proxy firms’ power has increased with the recent awakening of
shareholder democracy. Beginning around 2002, shareholder votes began to
shift from being ratifications of foregone conclusions to, on occasion,
genuine battles over corporate policy. The first indication of a change in the
dynamics of corporate governance came with successful campaigns to
eliminate staggered boards, which drove the number of classified boards
among S&P 500 companies from 303 in 1999 to 126 in 2012.150 Increased
shareholder activism may also be a response to the Enron-WorldCom
scandals of 2002. In 2010, Congress further intensified the focus on proxy
voting by requiring companies to put executive compensation plans to a
shareholder vote.151
Proxy firms have recently been the subjects of the same kinds of concerns
that led to major regulatory reforms for NRSROs. In 2013, SEC
Commissioner Gallagher recommended that the Commission explore
rulemaking reforms for proxy firms, including:
requiring them to follow a universal code of conduct, ensuring that their
recommendations are designed to increase shareholder value, increasing the
146. Rule 206(4)-6 under the Advisers Act provides that it is a “fraudulent, deceptive, or
manipulative act, practice or course of business” for a registered investment adviser to vote client
proxies unless the adviser: (1) adopts and implements written policies procedures that are designed
to ensure that proxies are voted in clients’ best interests and that address material conflicts of
interest; (2) discloses to clients how they may obtain information about how the adviser votes
proxies; and (3) describes the adviser’s policies and procedures to clients and furnishes them with
a copy upon request. 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-6 (2016).
147. Daniel M. Gallagher, Comm’r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Remarks at Society of Corporate
Secretaries & Governance Professionals, Seattle, Washington (July 11, 2013) [hereinafter Gallagher
Remarks at Society of Corp. Sec.] (describing the SEC as “enabler” of advisers treating proxy voting
based on “more of a compliance mindset than a fiduciary mindset”).
148. Proxy Voting by Investment Advisers, Advisers Act Release No. 2106, 79 SEC Docket
1673, at text accompanying n.25.
149. Gallagher Remarks at Society of Corp. Sec., supra note 147, at 4.
150. See Lucian Bebchuk, Scott Hirst & June Rhee, Toward the Declassification of S&P 500
Boards, 3 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 157, 165 (2013).
151. See Dodd-Frank, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 951, 124 Stat. 1376 (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. § 78n-1 (2012)).
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transparency of their methods, ensuring that conflicts of interest are dealt
with appropriately, and increasing their overall accountability. 152

Commissioner Gallagher’s concerns were reflected in testimony before a
House Subcommittee in which former SEC Chairman Harvey L. Pitt,
speaking on behalf of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, criticized SEC
positions in no-action letters issued to ISS and Glass Lewis in which the staff
recognized the power of a proxy firm’s proxy recommendation to “cleanse
the vote” of an adviser that had a conflict of interest.153 He also noted that the
staff took the position that an adviser need not make “a case-by-case
evaluation of a proxy voting firm’s potential conflicts,” but that general
reliance on the firm’s conflict of interest procedures would be sufficient.154
Chairman Pitt also contended that proxy firms generally provide little or no
opportunity to companies to respond to voting recommendations, which
undermined the accuracy of the information on which they relied.155
In 2014, the Commission issued a Staff Legal Bulletin that responded to
these concerns.156 The Bulletin appeared to reflect the SEC’s expectation that
advisers exercise greater diligence in evaluating proxy firms. For example,
the Commission expected advisers to conduct an ongoing review of the
firm’s conflicts of interest and adopt procedures designed to identify and
address firm conflicts that may arise on an ongoing basis, such as requiring
the firm to “update the investment adviser of business changes the investment
adviser considers relevant . . . or conflicts policies and procedures.”157
However, the guidance did not suggest a change in the staff’s position that
advisers need not be apprised on a “case-by-case” basis of a firm’s business
relationships with a company that is involved in the vote.
As to the proxy firm’s competence, the Commission required that an
adviser “ascertain that a proxy advisory firm has the competency and
capacity to adequately analyze proxy issues, which includes the ability to
make voting recommendations based on materially accurate information.”158
This statement appears to emphasize ensuring the accuracy of information,
but it may also be a response to charges that proxy firms routinely make
recommendations without having obtained information from the company
152. Gallagher Remarks at Society of Corp. Sec., supra note 147, at 6.
153. Proxy Firms Hearing, supra note 138, at 198 (citing No-Action Letter from U.S. Sec. &

Exch. Comm’n, Egan-Jones Proxy Services (May 27, 2004), https://www.sec.gov/divisions/invest
ment/noaction/egan052704.htm).
154. Id. at 197–98 (citing No-Action Letter from U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Institutional
Shareholder Servs., Inc. (Sept. 15, 2004), https://www.sec.gov/divisions/investment/noaction/iss09
1504.htm).
155. Id. at 193.
156. Proxy Voting Responsibilities of Investment Advisers and Availability of Exemptions from
the Proxy Rules for Proxy Advisory Firms, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (June 30, 2014), https://
www.sec.gov/interps/legal/cfslb20.htm [hereinafter Proxy Voting Responsibilities].
157. Id. at 3.
158. Id.
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involved in the vote. The Commission may expect advisers to confirm that
proxy firms’ recommendations are based on company-specific information.
Another source of proxy firm regulation is proxy regulation or, rather,
exemptions from proxy regulation. Providing advice on proxy votes
constitutes a solicitation that triggers proxy rules. These rules would be
exceedingly burdensome for proxy firms, so they rely on an exemption from
the rules that imposes four conditions as follows:
1. The proxy firm “renders financial advice in the ordinary course
of its business;”
2. The proxy firm disclosed to advice recipients: (1) “any
significant relationship” with the issuer or an affiliate, “or a
security holder proponent of the matter on which advice is
given,” and (2) “any material interests” in the matter;
3. The proxy firm receives no special compensation for furnishing
the advice from persons other than those who receive the advice
or similar advice; and
4. The advice is not furnished on behalf of any person soliciting
proxies or certain participants in an election.159
Like the SEC’s guidance to investment advisers,160 these conditions require
general disclosure of a “significant relationship” with a company or material
interest in the matter.
For purposes of determining whether consulting services created a
significant relationship or constituted material interest, the Commission
stated that the proxy firm “would likely consider:”
the type of service being offered to the company or security holder
proponent, the amount of compensation that the proxy advisory firm
receives for such service, and the extent to which the advice given to its
advisory client relates to the same subject matter as the transaction giving
rise to the relationship with the company or security holder proponent.161

The Commission added that the significant or material standards would be
met if “knowledge of the relationship or interest would reasonably be
expected to affect the recipient’s assessment of the reliability and objectivity
of the advisor and the advice.”162 This guidance suggests that the Commission
expects proxy firms to pay close attention to conflicts disclosures, but does
not reflect a substantive change in the SEC’s earlier positions. Although the
159. Rules and Regulations, Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-2(b)(3)
(2016). Alternatively, a proxy firm that only distributes reports containing voting recommendations
and does not vote proxies or apply a client’s voting guidelines in determining how to vote generally
may rely on the exemption in Rule 14a-2(b)(1). See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-2(b)(3) (2016)).
160. See generally Dodd-Frank, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 951, 124 Stat. 1376 (codified as amended
at 15 U.S.C. § 78n-1 (2012)).
161. Proxy Voting Responsibilities, supra note 156, at 5.
162. Id.
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Commission stated that proxy firms had an affirmative duty to make required
disclosures, it did not require that the disclosures be made in the document
containing the voting recommendation.163
The Staff Legal Bulletin may not be the last word on proxy advisory firm
regulation. On June 16, 2016, the House Financial Services Committee
approved the Corporate Governance Reform and Transparency Act of 2016
(Transparency Act).164 The Transparency Act would require proxy advisory
firms to register with the Commission and to disclose publicly both the
procedures and methodologies used in developing proxy recommendations
(including the relevance of a company’s size) and any conflicts of interest,
including services provided to and revenues received from corporate
issuers.165 It would require that firms implement written policies and
procedures designed to “address and manage any conflicts of interest that can
arise” from their business.166
The Transparency Act would require that firms have “staff sufficient to
produce proxy voting recommendations that are based on accurate and
current information,” permit issuers reasonable time to comment on draft
recommendations, and retain an ombudsman to receive complaints about
proxy voting information and resolve them prior to the vote.167 The original
version of the Transparency Act created a private right of action for a “subject
of a proxy advisory firm voting recommendation aggrieved by a proxy
advisory firm’s failure to comply” with these requirements.168
A proxy firm would be required to designate a CCO who is responsible
for the firm’s compliance policies and procedures. It would also have to file
confidential financial statements with the Commission and submit an annual
report stating the number of recommendations made and shareholder
proposals reviewed, the number of staff conducting the reviews and
formulating the recommendations, and the number of recommendations
made where the proponent was a client of or received services from the firm.
Echoing the regulation of NRSROs, the Transparency Act requires the
Commission to adopt rules that prohibit firms from:
1. Conditioning or threatening to condition recommendations on
the issuer’s purchase of other firm services or products; and
2. Modifying a recommendation or otherwise departing from the
firm’s adopted procedures and methodologies based on whether
the issuer subscribes to other firm services.169
163. Id. at 6.
164. See Corporate Governance Reform and Transparency Act of 2016, H.R. 5311, 114th Cong.

(2016).
165. See id. § 3.
166. See id.
167. See id.
168. See id.
169. See id.
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The Commission also must file annual reports that provide a broad qualitative
assessment of proxy firms, including firms’ “policies and methodologies”
and “quality of proxy advisory services issued by proxy advisory firms.”170
C. THE CFA INSTITUTE
Investment advisers routinely advertise the investment performance of
their clients’ accounts. While the Commission has adopted standardized
calculations for the investment performance of mutual funds, there are no
such requirements for other types of advisory accounts. Investment advisers
are subject to fiduciary duties under the Advisers Act, and to various SEC
rules, interpretations, and no-action positions under the Act, but none directly
addresses how investment performance should be calculated and presented.
The CFA Institute, which owns and awards the Certified Financial
Analyst designation,171 has substantially filled this void with the GIPS.172 The
GIPS constitute a set of rules for the calculation and presentation of
investment performance. The CFA Institute is similar to an NRSRO and
proxy advisory firm in that it is a standard setter, arguably the standard setter,
for a narrow category of conduct. A 2011 survey found that 75% of
responding institutional money managers claimed GIPS compliance.173
However, the CFA Institute does not examine advisory firms for compliance
with the GIPS or play any role in any kind of adjudication of their
compliance. Thus, the CFA Institute’s role is much narrower than that of
NRSROs and proxy advisory firms.
The GIPS, like bond ratings and voting recommendations, provide an
indirect means of complying with regulatory requirements. Although
compliance with GIPS is not legally required, many investment advisers
claim compliance with GIPS and many advisers view GIPS compliance as a
means of satisfying regulatory requirements,174 which implies some degree
of SEC acceptance of the GIPS as demonstrating that an adviser’s investment
performance advertising satisfies antifraud provisions of the Advisers Act.
Although the CFA Institute does not examine advisers for compliance
with GIPS, third party verification of GIPS compliance is a thriving business.
One survey found that more than 80% of GIPS compliant money managers
obtain third party verification of their GIPS compliance, with 30% citing
170. See id.
171. The CFA Institute is a global, not-for-profit professional association of investment analysts,

advisers, portfolio managers, and other investment professionals. See generally CFA INST., www.
cfainstitute.org (last visited Sept. 10, 2016).
172. CFA INST., GLOBAL INVESTMENT PERFORMANCE STANDARDS (2010), https://www.cfa
institute.org/learning/products/publications/ccb/Pages/ccb.v2010.n5.1.aspx.
173. ACA COMPLIANCE GRP. & EVESTMENT ALL., THE VALUE OF GIPS COMPLIANCE: 2012
MANAGER AND CONSULTANT SURVEY 7–8 (2012) [hereinafter 2012 MANAGER AND CONSULTANT
SURVEY], http://www.gipsstandards.org/news/Documents/aca_ea_gips_survey_2012.pdf.
174. In one survey, 37% of advisers indicated that they had adopted GIPS at least in part to satisfy
“regulatory requirements.” Id. at 8.
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“regulatory requirements” as one of the top three reasons for doing
so.175Many consider GIPS compliance to be necessary for an institutional
money manager to win new business, just as a minimum credit rating may be
necessary to establish adequate creditworthiness.176Software system
providers for investment advisers have incorporated GIPS compliant
reporting features as an important selling point.177
Firms that claim GIPS compliance effectively grant the GIPS the force
of law. The Commission has brought enforcement actions against firms that
falsely claim compliance with the GIPS.178 As one compliance consultant
stated, “the SEC and savvy institutional investors act as de facto policing
agents for the [GIPS].”179 The Commission takes the position that a GIPScompliant firm that fails to satisfy the GIPS has violated the law even if the
firm’s investment performance presentation is not otherwise misleading or
fraudulent. Thus, the failure of a firm claiming GIPS compliance to actually
comply with the GIPS is, in and of itself, an antifraud violation.
There is even evidence that the investment adviser community would
prefer that the GIPS, rather than the government, be the source of
performance advertising requirements. One survey found that 84% of
respondents agreed that money managers should be required to comply with
the GIPS or some type of reporting standard; only 52% believed that a
regulator should “develop more detailed performance advertising rules and
regulations.”180 The CFA Institute has even asked that the Commission
formalize its apparent approval of the GIPS by requiring that investment
advisers disclose whether they comply with the standard.181
The potential for GIPS-based violations illustrates one way in which
third party compliance standards can create unnecessary liability risk. For
175. Id. at 9.
176. “GIPS compliance is generally expected in many markets in order for investment

management firms to win new mandates, especially those that serve the institutional marketplace.”
Amy Jones & Arin Stancil, SEC Enforcement of GIPS® Compliance: A Closer Look, PRAC.
COMPLIANCE & RISK MGMT. SEC. INDUSTRY, Nov.–Dec. 2014, at 23, http://www.guardian
performancesolutions.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/SEC-Enforcement-of-GIPS%C2%AECompliance-A-Closer-Look.pdf.
177. Michael Kitces, Is GIPS Compliant Performance Reporting Becoming A New RIA
Differentiator?, KITCES (Aug. 18, 2014, 7:01 AM), https://www.kitces.com/blog/is-gips-compliant
-performance-reporting-becoming-a-new-ria-differentiator/.
178. See, e.g., ZPR Inv. Mgmt., Inc., Initial Decision Release No. 602, 108 SEC Docket 4502,
(May 27, 2014) (misrepresenting GIPS compliance in magazine and investment report); In re Locke
Capital Mgmt., Inc., Initial Decision Release No. 450, 102 SEC Docket 3628, (Feb. 6, 2012)
(misrepresenting GIPS compliance).
179. BOBBY ANKAR, THE CCO’S GUIDE TO THE GIPS STANDARDS: ESSENTIALS FOR AN
EFFECTIVE COMPLIANCE PROGRAM 1 (2013), http://www.acacompliancegroup.com/documents/
The%20CCO’s%20Guide%20to%20the%20GIPS%20Standards%20%20Essentials%20for%20an%20Effective%20Compliance%20Program.pdf.
180. See 2012 MANAGER AND CONSULTANT SURVEY, supra note 173, at 13.
181. Letter from Kurt Schacht, Managing Dir., & Linda Rittenhouse, Dir., CFA Inst., to Brent
Fields, Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Aug. 10, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-0915/s70915-20.pdf.
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example, claiming GIPS compliance may subject a firm to a more rigorous
SEC examination. If SEC staff members are trained in the GIPS, then they
may be more likely to find deficiencies. In 2013, one compliance consultant
opined that the SEC staff was examining GIPS compliance in greater detail,
becoming more proficient in the GIPS, and making comments that were
“much more technical and granular.”182 The detailed, prescriptive nature of
the GIPS standards may provide an easier path for the staff to find
deficiencies that provide a basis for a deficiency letter. It is possible that using
individualized investment performance policies and procedures may be less
likely to result in deficiencies than using GIPS.
A similar problem can be created to the extent that the GIPS impose a
higher standard than what is legally required. The Commission takes the
position that an adviser’s GIPS-compliance claim means complete
compliance. If a firm violates an aspect of GIPS that exceeds legal standards,
and the firm’s performance claims are not false or misleading except in
claiming GIPS compliance, the firm may be found liable both for the
inaccurate claim and for not following its own procedures.183 In that scenario,
an adviser that seeks to provide better disclosure may thereby bootstrap itself
into higher legal obligations—a kind of regulatory arbitrage in reverse. It has
been asserted with respect to at least one SEC GIPS-compliance enforcement
action that the violation would not otherwise have been problematic under
antifraud principles.184 In this case, the defendant’s GIPS-compliance claim
arguably created a kind of self-imposed liability risk.
The SEC staff has recognized the potential for self-imposed liability. For
example, the staff has specifically complained about advisers’ failure to
follow compliance policies and procedures “in areas that registrants included
in their policies and procedures, but that are not expressly required to be
reviewed by regulations (e.g., quarterly review of employees’ e-mails).”185
Rather than rewarding firms that seek higher compliance, the staff may be
more likely to punish them. This kind of penumbral liability arises not only
in the GIPS context, but whenever a firm, in holding itself to a higher
standard, adopts policies and procedures the violation of which leads to a
self-created enforcement action.186
182.
183.
184.
185.

ANKAR, supra note 179, at 1.
See Kitces, supra note 177.
See ZPR Inv. Mgmt., Inc., Initial Decision Release No. 602, 108 SEC Docket 4502.
OFFICE OF COMPLIANCE INSPECTIONS & EXAMINATIONS, EXAMINATIONS OF ADVISERS
AND FUNDS THAT OUTSOURCE THEIR CHIEF COMPLIANCE OFFICERS 5 (2015) [hereinafter
EXAMINATIONS OF ADVISERS].
186. See Rules and Regulations, Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-7
(2016). GIPS compliance liability could arise even if a firm never held itself as GIPS compliant.
Investment advisers are required to adopt and implement policies and procedures that are reasonably
designed to ensure compliance with securities laws, including antifraud provisions as applied to
investment performance advertising. If a firm’s internal policies and procedures provided that it
would calculate and present performance pursuant to GIPS, then GIPS noncompliance, regardless
of whether noncompliance arises from misleading performance calculations, presumably could
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Reliance on GIPS compliance also creates the risk that the standards are
underinclusive. Compliance with the GIPS will not necessarily satisfy all
legal standards for the calculation and presentation of investment
performance results. There are many published legal guides that catalogue
the compliance requirements that even perfect GIPS compliance will not
satisfy.187 A third party standard such as the GIPS, like a bond rating or voting
recommendation, creates the risk that firms will mistake full compliance with
the standard with full compliance with the law. In contrast, NRSRO ratings
historically have been coextensive with legal creditworthiness. When
NRSRO references in federal laws and rules were removed, NRSRO ratings,
like the GIPS, become simply a private brand that is indicative, but not
dispositive, of compliance.
D. PUBLIC COMPANY AUDITORS
Public company auditors, unlike NRSROs, proxy voting firms, and the
CFA Institute, reflect the quintessential model of a third party examiner.
Public companies are required to report their financial condition in financial
statements that have been audited by an independent public accountant.188
Although public company auditors serve this examination function, they do
not establish the accounting standards that they audit or participate in the
formal adjudication of compliance with accounting standards. Their only role
is that of third party compliance examiner.
This has not always been the case. Prior to the enactment of the SarbanesOxley Act of 2002 (Sarbanes-Oxley), the accounting industry controlled
accounting standards through the Financial Account Standards Board
(FASB), which was funded and substantially controlled by public accounting
firms. After Enron’s auditor failed to recognize its true financial condition,
Congress began to doubt the independence of the FASB.189 In 2002, Congress
formally vested private standard setters with the authority to establish
generally accepted accounting principles190 and mandated that such standard

constitute a failure to implement, and violate Rule 206(4)-7. Although this reflects the SEC’s
position, it is not clear whether a court would accept the agency’s theory of self-created legal
standards.
187. See, e.g., U.S. INV. PERF. COMM., PERFORMANCE ADVERTISING – RECONCILING THE
GIPS® STANDARDS WITH THE INVESTMENT ADVISERS ACT OF 1940, https://www.gipsstandards.
org/compliance/Documents/sec_gips_white_paper_final.pdf.
188. Broker-dealers must be audited by a PCAOB accountant annually. 15 U.S.C. § 78q(e)(1)(A)
(2012). This audit must include a review of the broker-dealer’s custody procedures, which must be
sufficient for the auditor to provide reasonable assurance that material inadequacies do not exist.
See General Rules and Regulations, Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 17 C.F.R. § 240.17a-5(g).
189. In the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Congress took the unusual step of naming Enron and with Global
Crossing, another firm the failure of which was associated with accounting abuses. See SarbanesOxley, Pub. L. No. 107-204, §705a, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 7211–19,
7231–34 (2012)).
190. See id. § 108, 15 U.S.C. § 7218.
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setters be funded by issuers rather than by the accounting industry.191 Industry
control over FASB was further diluted by Sarbanes-Oxley’s requirement that
a majority of a standard setter’s board be persons who have not been
associated with a registered accounting firm during the preceding two
years.192
Congress also created the PCAOB to oversee public company auditors.
Prior to the Enron scandal, a former chairman of PricewaterhouseCoopers
LLP testified that the accounting “profession’s combination of public
oversight and voluntary self-regulation is extensive, Byzantine, and
insufficient.”193 This Byzantine system was substantially replaced by the
PCAOB, a five-member, SEC-appointed, self-regulatory entity tasked with
overseeing public company auditors.
Sarbanes-Oxley granted the PCAOB the authority, subject to SEC
oversight, to register public accounting firms; establish standards for the
audit of public companies; and inspect, investigate, and sanction registered
firms.194 To strengthen the independence of the PCAOB, Sarbanes-Oxley
required that at least a majority of the PCAOB be non-CPAs and that the
Chair not have practiced public accounting in the preceding five years.195
Congress created yet another overseer of public company auditors by
mandating, in effect, that public companies create audit committees.196 The
audit committee must be comprised of independent directors and have both
the authority to hire and fire the auditor and sufficient funding to pay the
auditor.197 Sarbanes-Oxley required the auditor to report to the audit
committee all critical accounting policies and practices, alternative Generally
Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) treatments discussed with
management, their significance and the auditor’s preference, and all written
communications between the auditor and management.
Congress also established new requirements that were designed to
strengthen auditors’ independence.198 Sarbanes-Oxley created what is known
as “mandatory partner rotation.” Specifically, auditors were prohibited from
auditing a firm if the audit partner having primary responsibility for the audit
had performed audit services for the issuer in each of the preceding five
years.199 Sarbanes-Oxley did not, however, require auditor rotation,

191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.

Id. §§ 108(b), 109, 15 U.S.C. § 7266.
Id. § 108(b), 15 U.S.C. § 7266.
S. REP. NO. 107-205, at 5 (2002).
See Sarbanes-Oxley § 101, 15 U.S.C. § 7211.
See id.
See id. § 204 (amending 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1). Although the Act did not require the formation
of an audit committee, it deemed the entire board to be an audit committee in the absence of one,
which made it impracticable not to form an audit committee.
197. Id. § 301, 15 U.S.C. § 78f.
198. See infra notes 199–208 and accompanying text.
199. See Sarbanes-Oxley § 203 (amending 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1).
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notwithstanding the long tenure of many auditors with their clients,200 but
instructed the Office of Government Accountability to study the issue.201
Relatedly, Sarbanes-Oxley prohibited auditors from auditing a company if a
senior executive officer of the company had been employed by the auditor
and participated in the issuer audit within the twelve months preceding the
audit.202
Other independence reforms essentially codified preexisting SEC rules.
For example, Sarbanes-Oxley prohibited auditors from providing the
following non-audit services: bookkeeping and other services related to a
company’s accounting records or financial statements, financial information
systems design and implementation, appraisal, valuation or fairness opinions,
actuarial, internal audit, management functions, human resources,
broker/dealer, investment adviser, or investment banking services, or legal
and expert services.203 As to other non-audit services, Sarbanes-Oxley
required the auditor to disclose them in SEC filings and obtain preapproval
from the audit committee, with the exception of certain de minimis non-audit
services that may be approved at any time prior to the completion of the
audit.204
Sarbanes-Oxley prohibited any person, in violation of SEC rules, from
acting on behalf of an issuer to influence improperly an accountant in the
performance of the issuer’s audit, for the purpose of rendering the audited
financial statements materially misleading.205This provision authorized civil
enforcement of its terms by the Commission.206
Sarbanes-Oxley required that the auditor’s financial report reflect any
“material correcting adjustments” the auditor has identified207 and that the
auditor make quarterly and annual disclosure of significant off-balance sheet
items. It required the auditor letter to describe the scope of the auditor’s

200. In 2003, the tenure of auditors of Fortune 1000 companies averaged twenty-two years. See
U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-04-216, REPORT TO THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON
BANKING, HOUSING AND URBAN AFFAIRS AND THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL SERVICES,
REQUIRED STUDY ON THE POTENTIAL EFFECTS OF MANDATORY AUDIT FIRM ROTATION 6 (2003)
[hereinafter MANDATORY AUDIT FIRM ROTATION].
201. See Sarbanes-Oxley § 207.
202. Id. § 206 (amending 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1) (officers include the chief executive officer,
controller, chief financial officer and others in equivalent positions).
203. Id. § 201 (amending 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1). These requirements had, for the most part, been
imposed by the Commission as a condition of an auditor being treated as independent with the
exception that the SEC requirements apply during full period of the professional engagement. See
Strengthening the Commission’s Requirements Regarding Auditor Independence, 68 Fed. Reg.
6044 (Feb. 5, 2003) (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 210.2-01(c)(4)(i)–(ix) (2016)). Prior to the SarbanesOxley Act, big 4 revenues for non-audit services averaged 50 percent of total revenues. See S. REP.
NO. 107-75, at 14 (2002).
204. See Sarbanes-Oxley § 202 (amending 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1).
205. See id. § 303, 15 U.S.C. § 7242.
206. See id.
207. See id. § 401(a)(i), 15 U.S.C. § 7261.
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testing of the company’s internal controls and its findings regarding those
controls.208
Congress was also concerned about concentration in the auditor
marketplace but took no specific steps to remedy the problem. It ordered the
GAO to study the issue and make recommendations. The GAO confirmed
Congress’s concerns in finding that, in 2003, about 70% of the approximately
15,000 public company clients of 700 accounting firms were audited by one
of only four accounting firms (the Big 4).209
Whereas the Financial Crisis of 2008 prompted a massive overhaul of
NRSRO regulation, it led to few changes to public company auditor
regulation. One small but high profile change required that companies that
use conflict minerals submit an annual report to the Commission, which
includes an independent private sector audit of the report and identifies the
auditor.210 The audit is subject to the GAO’s Government Auditing
Standards, which can be satisfied by meeting the standards for Attestations
Engagements or Performance Audits.211 Only the former must be conducted
by a CPA firm.212 The auditor of a company’s financial statements is
permitted to conduct the private audit, but it will be treated as a non-audit
service requiring pre-approval.213 Although the Act did not characterize the
208. See id. § 103(a)(2)(A)(iii), 15 U.S.C. § 7213. See also Dodd-Frank, Pub. L. No. 111-203, §
404(b), 124 Stat. 1376 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 7262 (2012)) (requiring public
companies to adopt internal controls). However, the Commission exempted small issuers from the
internal controls requirement, thereby obviating the auditor attestation, and Congress codified that
exemption in 2010. See Dodd-Frank § 989G(c). Dodd-Frank required the Commission to study
exempting midsized companies as well, but the Commission ultimately recommended against
taking that step. See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, STUDY AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON SECTION
404(B) OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002 FOR ISSUERS WITH PUBLIC FLOAT BETWEEN $75
AND $250 MILLION Part VI.B.1 (2011).
209. See MANDATORY AUDIT FIRM ROTATION, supra note 200, at 10–11 (the 700 firms were the
members of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants’ former self-regulatory program
for audit quality; the four firms were: PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, Ernst & Young LLP, Deloitte
& Touche LLP, and KPMG LLP; the remaining 30% were audited by approximately 688 firms).
210. Sarbanes-Oxley § 1502.
211. Conflict Minerals, Exchange Act Release No. 67,716, (Nov. 13, 2012) (codified at 17 C.F.R.
pts. 240, 249(b)). In 2013 and 2014, half of private sector audits were conducted pursuant to the
Attestation Standard. See Christine Robinson & Kristen Sullivan, Anticipating the Independent
Private Sector Audit after the Year 2 Conflict Minerals Reporting Cycle, DELOITTE (Aug. 25, 2015),
http://www.iasplus.com/en/publications/us/heads-up/2015/issue-29.
The
independence
requirements under GAGAS are primarily principles-based, with certain specifically prohibited
non-audit services. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-331G, GOVERNMENT
AUDITING STANDARDS 3.01–3.59 (2011) (prohibiting non-audit management services at 3.35,
preparation of audited records at 3.50, and preparation of the audited report at 3.51). It is likely that
these independence requirements would substantially overlap with the SEC’s independence
requirements for public company auditors.
212. U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Frequently Asked Questions, Conflict Materials, U.S. SEC. &
EXCH. COMM’N (Apr. 17, 2014), https://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/guidance/conflictmineralsfaq.htm?_ga=1.158378170.1289200159.1469974041.
213. See Conflict Minerals, Exchange Act Rel. No. 67,716 at text accompanying n.650. In 2013
and 2014, half of private sector audits were conducted pursuant to the Attestation Standard. See
Robinson & Sullivan, supra note 211..
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report as a filing, the Commission takes the position that the report, and
therefore the audit, is subject to liability under Section 18 of the Exchange
Act.214
Subsequent reforms have included the Jumpstart Our Business Startups
(JOBS) Act of 2012’s extension of the internal controls audit exemption to
emerging growth companies,215 and the PCAOB’s requirements, effective in
2017, that auditors name the engagement partner and provide information on
other firms that participated in the audit.216
E. CHIEF COMPLIANCE OFFICERS
The CCO mandate for investment advisers establishes yet another kind
of third party compliance examiner. Rule 206(4)-7 under the Advisers Act
requires that registered investment advisers designate a CCO who is
responsible for administering the adviser’s compliance policies and
procedures (CCO Rule).217 Although the CCO normally is not a third party
but an employee of the adviser, some advisers retain third party CCOs and
many outsource CCO functions. A Charles Schwab study found that, in 2011,
38% of advisory firms outsourced at least part of their compliance function,
up from 27% the previous year.218 Thus, the CCO function is often
outsourced to third parties, which may include, for example, third party
verifiers of GIPS compliance.
The CCO Rule provides no qualification or independence requirements
for the CCO, but the Commission has suggested what characteristics it
expects of CCOs:
An adviser’s chief compliance officer should be competent and
knowledgeable regarding the Advisers Act and should be empowered with
full responsibility and authority to develop and enforce appropriate policies
and procedures for the firm. . . . [and] should have a position of sufficient
seniority and authority within the organization to compel others to adhere
to the compliance policies and procedures.219
214. See Conflict Minerals, supra, at text accompanying nn. 339 - 42.
215. See Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 103, 126 Stat. 306 (2012)

(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1 (2012)).
216. See Order Granting Approval of Proposed Rules to Require Disclosure of Certain Audit
Participants on a New PCAOB Form and Related Amendments to Auditing Standards, Exchange
Act Release No. 77,787, 2016 WL 2621668 (May 9, 2016) (approving requirements to name partner
and identify participating accounting firms in audit reports issued after, respectively January, 1,
2017, and June 30, 2017).
217. See 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-7(c) (2016).
218. See EXAMINATIONS OF ADVISERS, supra note 185, at 1 n.2 (citing Press Release,
Independent Advisors’ Revenue and Assets Rebound for Record Year, Says 2011 Charles Schwab
RIA Benchmarking Study (July 5, 2011), http://pressroom.aboutschwab.com/press-release/schwabadvisor-services-news/independent-advisors-revenue-and-assets-rebound-record-ye).
219. Compliance Programs of Investment Companies and Investment Advisers, Investment
Advisers Act Release No. 2204, Investment Company Act Release No. 26,299, 81 SEC Docket
2775 (Dec. 17, 2003).
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The Commission conducted an Outsourced CCO Initiative for the
purpose of evaluating the outsourcing of the CCO function, which provides
further insight into what the agency expects from a third party examiner.220
For example, the staff applauded CCOs “who frequently and personally
interacted with advisory and fund employees (in contrast with impersonal
interaction, such as electronic communication or pre-defined checklists).”221
In some cases, the SEC staff has provided detailed guidance as to compliance
procedures that CCOs should implement.222
The staff also emphasized the importance of CCOs’ authority to exercise
control over compliance functions, such as by determining independently
what records the CCO would review. In a 2015 enforcement action against
an outside CCO, the Commission specifically complained that the CCO
relied on information provided by the adviser regarding assets under
management and the number of accounts.223
The Commission has adopted a companion rule that requires that mutual
funds designate a CCO and take steps to ensure the CCO’s independence
from a fund’s service providers (Mutual Fund CCO Rule).224 Mutual funds
are technically independent of their service providers, but as a practical
matter they are controlled by their sponsor, which is usually the fund’s
investment adviser. The Mutual Fund CCO Rule, like money market fund
creditworthiness rules, therefore operates as a de facto third party examiner
for investment advisers.
The Mutual Fund CCO Rule takes a very different approach from that of
the CCO Rule. For example, the Mutual Fund CCO Rule specifically
addresses the potential for undue influence by the sponsor, by prohibiting the
sponsor from “directly or indirectly tak[ing] any action to coerce, manipulate,
mislead, or fraudulently influence the fund’s chief compliance officer in the
performance of his or her duties. . . .”225 Additionally, directors of the fund
who are independent of the fund’s sponsor must control the designation,
compensation, and removal of the CCO.226
A mutual fund CCO must provide an annual written compliance report
to the fund’s board and meet annually with its independent directors. The
report must identify material compliance matters, which are defined to
include not only violations of the federal securities laws, but also any
220. See EXAMINATIONS OF ADVISERS, supra note 185, at 3.
221. Id. at 3–4.
222. See, e.g., U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N OFFICE OF COMPLIANCE INSPECTIONS &

EXAMINATIONS, SAFEGUARDING CLIENTS’ ASSETS UNDER MANAGEMENT THROUGH ASSET
VERIFICATION AND RECONCILIATION (2009), https://www.sec.gov/info/iaiccco/iaiccco-custody.pd
f.
223. See EXAMINATIONS OF ADVISERS, supra note 185, at 5 n.13 (citing Aegis Capital, LLC,
Exchange Act Release No. 74,608, Advisors Act Release No. 4054, Investment Company Act
Release No. 31,541, 2015 WL 1407563 (Mar. 30, 2015).
224. Investment Company Act of 1940, 17 C.F.R. § 270.38a-1 (2016).
225. Id.
226. Id. § 270.38a-1(a)(4).
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“weakness in the design or implementation of the policies and procedures of
the fund” or its primary service providers.227
Like public company auditors, CCOs are exposed to personal liability.
The Commission has brought a number of enforcement actions based on
CCOs’ failure to provide adequate compliance oversight,228 and the
defendant in at least one case was a third party.229 In response to two of these
cases involving internal CCOs, Commissioner Gallagher accused the
Commission of having “unfairly contorted the rule to treat the compliance
function as a new business line, with compliance officers assuming the role
of business heads,” and interpreted the CCO Rule “as being targeted at
CCOs.”230 He contended further that the SEC’s enforcement actions would
“disincentivize a vigorous compliance function at investment advisers.”
F. COMPLIANCE CONSULTANTS
In a number of settled enforcement actions, the Commission has required
that the defendant agree to retain an independent compliance consultant to
review and make recommendations regarding the defendant’s compliance
program. The terms of the consultant requirement are generally quite
similar.231 The adviser must hire an independent consultant “not unacceptable
to the staff of the Commission” to conduct a comprehensive review of and
recommend corrective measures concerning the adviser’s policies and
procedures with respect to designated areas of compliance. The areas covered
may be specific (e.g., “due diligence prior to adding new clients”) or quite
broad (e.g., “detecting and addressing fraud”).
The SEC’s settlement with Apex Fund Services reflects the standard
terms that the Commission requires.232 For example, it required that the
consultant be retained within forty-five days and that the Commission be
provided with a copy of the engagement letter within thirty days thereafter.
The consultant was required to submit an initial report to the Commission
within ninety days of retention, which describes the compliance review, the
consultant’s conclusions and recommendations, and procedures for
implementing the recommendations. The adviser was required to implement
227. Id. See generally BlackRock Advisors LLC, Advisers Act Release No. 4065, Investment
Company Act Release No. 31,558, 2015 WL 1776222 (Apr. 20, 2015) (charging CCO with failure
to report material compliance matter).
228. See, e.g., id. Thomas R. Delaney II, Initial Decision Release No. 755, 109 SEC Docket 962
(Mar. 18, 2015).
229. See Aegis Capital, LLC, Exchange Act Release No. 74,608, Advisors Act Release No. 4054,
Investment Company Act Release No. 31,541, 2015 WL 1407563 (Mar. 30, 2015)
230. Daniel M. Gallagher, Comm’r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Statement on Recent SEC
Settlements Charging Chief Compliance Officers with Violations of Investment Advisers Act Rule
206(4)-7 (June 18, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/news/statement/sec-cco-settlements-iaa-rule-206-47.html.
231. See, e.g., Apex Fund Services (US), Inc., Investment Advisers Act Release No. 4429, 2016
WL 3345650 (June 16, 2016).
232. See generally id.

2016]

Mandatory Third Party Compliance Examinations

153

the recommendations within ninety days after the initial report, and a final
report was due within nine months of the order, which describes the
implementation of the recommendations. The adviser had the right to appeal,
in effect, the consultant’s recommendations to the SEC staff. The adviser had
to complete implementation of the recommendations no more than one year
following the settlement, and certify compliance with the consultant
requirement no later than sixty days after completion.
The orders do not define “Independent Consultant”233 or otherwise
address the consultant’s qualifications or experience except for the double
negative that the consultant shall not be unacceptable to the SEC staff.
However, the order generally requires, in order “[t]o ensure the independence
of the Consultant,” that the adviser: (1) not be able to fire the consultant
without SEC staff approval, (2) compensate the consultant “at their
reasonable and customary rates,” and (3) not “invoke the attorney-client or
other doctrine or privilege to prevent the Consultant from communicating
with or transmitting any information, reports or documents to the
Commission’s staff.”234
A separate provision also appears to address, without specifically
referencing, the issue of the compliance consultant’s independence. The
adviser must require the consultant to agree not to provide any professional
services to the adviser or its affiliates during the engagement, and two years
thereafter, and to require the consultant’s affiliates to not provide services as
well.235 Including the timeline described above, the practical effect is to
prohibit future work for approximately three years after the engagement, but
there is no restriction on the consultant’s prior relationship with the
adviser.236
233. See, e.g., id. (the Commission appears to use “Independent Compliance Consultant” as a
title rather than a defined term).
234. See, e.g., id.
235. This requirement was the subject of complaints by two SEC Commissioners in connection
with an SEC order that did not impose such an independence requirement. See Luis A. Aguilar &
Kara M. Stein, Comm’r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Dissenting Statement in the Matter of
Oppenheimer & Co., Inc. (Feb. 4, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/news/statement/dissentingstatement-oppenheimer-inc.html#_edn10. The Commissioners objected that the settlement did not
require that the consultant be “qualified or independent — i.e., one that has not worked for
Oppenheimer in the past, much less on Rule 506 matters. This is unacceptable, and a departure from
the Commission’s usual practice.” Id.
236. Some orders include additional terms. See, e.g., Royal Alliance Assoc., Inc., Exchange Act
Release No. 77,362, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 4351, 2016 WL 945975 (Mar. 14, 2014)
(requiring that consultant be provided access to materials and personnel as needed to conduct review
and keep preserve records of compliance with consultant undertaking for six years); Guggenheim
Partners Inv. Mgmt., LLC, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 4163, 2015 WL 4720298 at *8
(Aug. 10, 2015) (firm “shall not be in, or have an attorney-client relationship with” the consultant
or invoke the privilege to prevent consultant transmissions to the staff; records of compliance with
consultant undertaking shall be preserved for six years); BlackRock Advisors LLC, Advisers Act
Release No. 4065, Investment Company Act Release No. 31,558, 2015 WL 1776222 (Apr. 20,
2015) (requiring that consultant be provided access to materials and personnel as needed to conduct
review, and records of compliance with consultant undertaking be preserved for five years);
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In some cases, settling firms appear to have avoided the compliance
consultant requirement as a formal condition by retaining a compliance
consultant prior to settlement.237 The order typically notes that the firm has
retained a compliance consultant and describes some aspects of the
relationship. However, the order does not require the engagement as a
specific undertaking, much less set forth its specific terms.238
G. SURPRISE AND INTERNAL CONTROLS AUDITORS
The closest that current law comes to a third party adviser examination
requirement is the mandatory custody audit under the Custody Rule.239 The
Custody Rule requires, among other things, that registered investment
advisers that have custody of client assets240 retain an independent public
accountant to conduct a surprise custody audit each calendar year.241 In some
cases, an adviser may be required to obtain an internal control report from an

Barclays Capital Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 73,183, Investment Advisers Release No. 3929,
109 SEC Docket 5029 (Sept. 23, 2014) (requiring retention of consultant within 270 days and
completed review 180 days thereafter; requiring consultant be provided access to materials and
personnel as needed to conduct review; firm “shall not be in, and shall not have an attorney-client
relationship with” the consultant or invoke the privilege to prevent consultant transmissions to the
staff; records of compliance with consultant undertaking to be preserved for six years); Equitas
Capital Advisors, LLC, Exchange Act Release No. 70,743, Investment Advisers Act Release No.
3704, 107 SEC Docket 273 (Oct. 13, 2013) (requiring three annual reviews and omitting condition
regarding attorney-client privilege); Northern Lights Compliance Services, LLC, Investment
Company Act Release No. 30,502, 106 SEC Docket 1134 (May 2, 2013) (same as in Blackrock
Advisors).
237. See, e.g., Cranshire Capital Advisors, LLC, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 4277,
2015 WL 7423035 (Nov. 23, 2015); Virtus Inv. Advisers, Inc., Investment Advisers Act Release
No. 4266, Investment Company Act Release No. 31,901, 2015 WL 7179719 (Nov. 16, 2015)
(settlement reflects firm’s prior retention of consultant); Stephen Derby Gisclair, Exchange Act
Release No. 70,742, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 3703, 107 SEC Docket 2728 (Oct. 23,
2015) (prior hiring of “independent consultant” is undertaking for which certification must be
provided).
238. See, e.g., Cranshire Capital Advisors, LLC, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 4277,
2015 WL 7423035 (Nov. 23, 2015); Virtus Inv. Advisers, Inc., Investment Advisers Act Release
No. 4266, Investment Company Act Release No. 31,901, 2015 WL 7179719 (Nov. 16, 2015)
(settlement reflects firm’s prior retention of consultant); Stephen Derby Gisclair, Exchange Act
Release No. 70,742, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 3703, 107 SEC Docket 2728 (Oct. 23,
2015) (prior hiring of “independent consultant” is undertaking for which certification must be
provided).
239. See 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-2 (2016).
240. The Custody Rule refers to client “funds and securities.” The Custody Rule does not apply
to client assets held by an adviser that are not “funds and securities.” For simplicity, the term
“assets” is used herein to refer to “funds and securities.”
241. The Custody Rule has included some form of surprise audit requirement since its inception.
See generally Custody of Funds or Securities of Clients by Investment Advisers, Advisers Act
Release No. 2876 at text accompanying n.13–14 (May 20, 2009). It was first adopted in 1962, when
it required that all advisers with custody undergo a surprise examination by an independent public
accountant. In 1997, the Commission amended the Rule to apply only to registered investment
advisers. It amended the rule in 2002 to create an exemption from the surprise audit requirement
when a qualified custodian held custody and provided account statements directly to clients.
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independent public accountant on internal controls relating to pooled
investment-vehicle assets.242
An adviser has custody if it or a related person243 holds client assets or
has the authority to obtain possession of them.244 A related requirement is
that all client assets must be in the custody of a “qualified custodian,” a term
that includes banks, broker-dealers, foreign financial institutions, and certain
futures commission merchants.
The timing of the surprise audit “must be irregular from year to year, so
that the adviser will be unaware of the date on which it will take place.”245
The audit must be provided pursuant to a written agreement246 that requires
the accountant to file a Form ADV-E with the Commission within 120 days
of the audit, which describes the scope and nature of the examination.247 The
Custody Rule does not expressly require that the accountant identify
problems, but Form ADV-E goes a bit further than the Custody Rule in
requiring a “certificate of accounting.”248 The Custody Rule provides that,
within four days of the termination of the arrangement, a Form ADV-E must
be filed that is accompanied by a statement containing the date of the
termination and explaining any examination-related problems that
contributed to the termination. Form ADV-E is publicly available in the
Investment Adviser Registration Depository.249 The agreement must also
require the accountant to notify the Commission by facsimile or electronic
mail within one day of finding any material discrepancies in the audit.
A surprise audit is not required in three situations. First, it is not required
for client assets that are solely in the custody of an “operationally
independent” related person. A related person is operationally independent if
there are no circumstances that would reasonably be expected to compromise
242. Id.
243. A related person is “any person, directly or indirectly, controlling or controlled by [the

advisers], and any person that is under common control with [the adviser].” Investment Advisers
Act of 1940, 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-2(d)(7).
244. See id. § 275.206(4)-2(d)(2). Custody exists, for example, when an adviser receives a check
from a client, has the power to withdraw client assets, or has legal ownership of client assets (such
as a trustee for a trust that holds client assets). See id.
245. Custody of Funds or Securities of Clients by Investment Advisers, Advisers Act Release No.
2876, at n.8. See 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-2(a)(4).
246. The recordkeeping rule under the Act requires that the adviser keep the surprise auditor
agreement for five years from the end of the fiscal year “in which the last entry was made,” the first
two years in an appropriate office of the adviser. 17 C.F.R. §§ 275.204-2(a)(10), (e)(1).
247. The 120 days run from the initial date of the surprise audit. Custody of Funds or Securities
of Clients by Investment Advisers, Advisers Act Release No. 2876 at text accompanying n.28. In
addition to the specific procedures an independent public accountant must follow during a surprise
examination, the accountant should perform any additional audit procedures it deems necessary
under the circumstances. See Nature of Examination Required to be Made of All Funds and
Securities Held in Custody of Investment Advisers and Related Accountant’s Certificate, Advisers
Act Release No. 201, 1966 WL 85149 at *1 (May 26, 1966).
248. Form ADV-E, 17 C.F.R. § 279.8.
249. Independent Public Accountants Guide: Form ADV-E Surprise Examination Filing, INV.
ADVISER REG. DEPOSITORY, www.iard.com/pdf/formadv-e (last visited Oct. 4, 2016).
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the operational independence of the related person and four requirements are
satisfied: (1) the client assets are not subject to claims of the adviser’s
creditors; (2) no advisory personnel has possession of, access to, or otherwise
the opportunity to misappropriate the client assets; (3) no personnel of the
related person who has access to the assets is under common supervision with
any advisory personnel; and (4) no advisory personnel holds a position with
or shares premises with the related person.250
Second, the surprise audit is not required as to client assets of which the
adviser has custody solely as a result of the authority to make withdrawals to
pay the adviser’s fee. However, if a related person acts as the qualified
custodian of the assets, this exception applies only if the related person is
operationally independent of the adviser.251
Third, a surprise audit is not required for the account of a limited
partnership if the partnership:
1. Is audited by an independent public accountant that is registered
with and subject to inspection by the PCAOB during the
engagement through the end of the calendar year (PCAOB
accountant);
2. Delivers annual, GAAP-based, audited financial statements to
all limited partners within 120 days of the end of the fiscal year;
and
3. Is audited upon liquidation and distributes the financial
statements promptly after completion of the audit.252
Additional audit requirements apply if the adviser or a related person acts
as the qualified custodian of client assets.253 First, a PCAOB accountant must
conduct the surprise audit.254 Second, the adviser must obtain, or receive from
the related person, an internal control report each calendar year that is written
by an independent PCAOB accountant.255 The report must opine on “whether
controls have been placed in operation as of a specific date, and are suitably
designed and are operating effectively to meet control objectives relating to
250. See Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-2(d)(5). The Custody Rule
does not apply to an account of a registered investment company.
251. Id.
252. Id. Only auditors that audit public companies, brokers or dealers are subject to PCAOB
inspection. See 15 U.S.C. § 1714(a) (2012); PCAOB RULE 4020T (temporary rule subjecting
auditors of brokers and dealers to PCAOB inspection).
253. Surprise custody audits are not required if a related person that acts as the qualified custodian
is not operationally related to the adviser, but the adviser still must obtain an internal control report
from the related person. See 17 § C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-2(a)(6)(ii).
254. See 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-2(a)(6)(i); Staff Reponses to Questions about the Custody Rule
at Question II.8, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov/divisions/investment/custody_
faq_030510.htm (last updated Sept. 1, 2013).
255. Although the surprise audit requirement does not apply to assets held by an operationally
independent related person, no such exemption applies for the internal control report. See 17 C.F.R.
§ 275.206(4)-2(a)(6)(ii).
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custodial services, including the safeguarding” of client assets during the
year. The report also must verify that client assets are reconciled to a
custodian other than the adviser or related person.256
An accountant is independent if they meet the independence standards in
paragraphs (b) and (c) of Rule 2-01 under Regulation S-X (Independence
Rule).257 Under paragraph (b), an accountant is not independent if a
“reasonable investor with knowledge of all relevant facts and circumstances
would conclude that the accountant is not capable of exercising objective and
impartial judgment on all issues encompassed within the accountant’s
engagement.”258
Paragraph (c) provides a non-exclusive list of circumstances that would
render an accountant not independent, including:
1. A “direct financial interest or a material indirect financial interest
in the accountant’s audit client, such as” investments in
securities issued by the client or by an entity that controls the
client;
2. Lending and credit relationships, certain uninsured savings and
checking accounts, employment and underwriting relationships,
and certain brokerage relationships with the client;
3. Investments in the client;
4. Business relationships with the client (other than services
provided in the ordinary course by the accountant);
5. Providing certain non-audit, audit-related services to the client;
6. Providing any services to the client on a contingency basis, and
7. The failure to comply with lead partner rotation requirements.259
These standards generally apply to affiliates of the accountant and the client,
as appropriate.260 Surprise and internal controls auditors are also subject to
the lead partner rotation requirement, which prohibits an audit partner who
has been the lead partner on the engagement for the preceding five years from
acting as the lead partner in the ensuing five-year period.261
In some respects, the Independence Rule’s terms do not fit the context of
a surprise or internal controls audit. For example, the Independence Rule
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.

See id. § 275.206(4)-2.
See id. §§ 210.2-01(b), 210.2-01(c).
See id. § 210.2-01(b).
See id. § 210.2-01(c).
See id. §§ 210.2-01(f)(1), 210.2-01(f)(1)(2) (“accountant” includes any accounting firm with
which the accountant is affiliated; “accounting firm” includes the firm’s “parents, subsidiaries and
associated entities”); id. §§ 210.0-01(f)(4), 210.0-01(f)(6) (“audit client” includes affiliates of the
audit client, which include an entity in the audit client’s control family, over which the client
exercises significant influence or that exercises significant influence over the audit client).
261. See id. § 210.2-01(c)(6).
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refers to “issuers,” whereas surprise and internal controls auditors do not
audit issuers as such. The SEC staff has provided limited guidance on this
issue, such as by clarifying that non-audit services would be prohibited only
to the extent that the non-audit services would put the auditor in the position
of auditing its own work.262 However, it appears that the Independence Rule’s
exemption from the rotation requirement for small firms is not available for
surprise or internal controls auditors.
CONCLUSION
The Commission appears to be on the verge of requiring investment
advisers to undergo third party examinations. To date, SEC officials have
provided the principal justification that the Commission lacks the resources
to examine investment advisers frequently enough. The rule would also
indirectly accomplish the SEC goal of creating an examination-only SRO for
investment advisers.
A third party examination requirement for investment advisers may be
vulnerable to claims that it is arbitrary and capricious under the
Administrative Procedure Act, on the general ground that the Commission
has failed to conduct an adequate cost-benefit analysis. Over the last decade,
courts have vacated a number of SEC rules on this basis. On somewhat more
speculative grounds, the rulemaking could be challenged as usurping
Congress’s power of the purse by imposing an unauthorized tax on
investment advisers, or Congress’s authority to permit the creation of a SRO
for investment advisers. The Commission would likely adopt such a rule
under the authority granted under Section 206(4) of the Advisers Act, but
there are strong arguments that a third party examination rule would exceed
this authority. Such a challenge not only could defeat the rulemaking, but
could also undermine the viability of other rules adopted under that provision.
There are numerous examples of third party examiners that could provide
useful models for a third party examination rule for advisers. This article
surveys seven regulatory models for third party compliance examiners in
order to provide a framework for thinking about how a third party compliance
rule might be designed. These examiners include: NRSROs, proxy advisory
firms, the CFA Institute, public company auditors, CCOS, compliance
consultants, and surprise and internal controls auditors. Each serves a
distinctly different third party examination role, and their regulation is
equally varied, if not always consistent.

262. Office of the Chief Accountant, Application of Commission’s Rules on Auditor Independence
Frequently Asked Questions, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov/info/accountants/
ocafaqaudind080607.htm (last updated Dec. 13, 2011). For a surprise audit this would normally not
be the case because the audit is limited to custody issues. The staff has also clarified that, for
purposes of the Independence Rule, the date that the engagement agreement is executed, attest
procedures begin, or the surprise examination period begins, as applicable. Id.

